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L Introduction
American antitrust law has reached a critical phase in its evolution. After
initially resolving a principal tension in the Sherman Act through endorsement
of a "rule of reason" in 1911,' the Supreme Court almost immediately turned
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. The author would like to thank
Ms. Rhonda Dickens, Howard University School of Law, Class of 2001, for her valuable
research assistance, and Professor Scott Sundby for the opportunity to participate in this
Symposium. Appreciation also goes to Andrew E. Taslitz, William E. Kovacic, Jonathan B.
Baker, Richard T. Rapp and Daniel L. Rubinfeld for their helpful comments on earlier versions
of the Article.
1. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911) (finding that courts
should use rule of reason to identify violations of Sherman Act).
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down the path of rigid, bright line per se prohibitions. 2 From 19273 through
1972, 4 those per se rules expanded, engulfing much ofthe law of antitrust and
leaving little room for thoughtful economic analysis of conduct suspected of
injuring competition.5 These decisions reduced antitrust law to a categorization scheme, in which courts swiftly pigeon-holed conduct for condemnation
or, on occasion, for more lengthy consideration. Rigid categories and sub-

categories of "horizontal" and "vertical" conduct confined antitrus analysis
to a neat, but ultimately uninformative framework.
Figure IA:
Traditional Categories of
Horizontal Restraints
Horizontal
Restraints
Price Fixing
Division of Markets

Group Boycotts
I Concerted Refusals to Deal

Per Se

Qualified
Per Se

Other Collaborations
Ancillary Restraints

Rule of Reason

2. See Doctor Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 385 (1911)
(finding that minimum resale price maintenance is per se unlawful).
3. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) (stating that
price fixing by competitors is per so unlawful).
4. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (finding that
division of markets by competitors is per so unlawful).
5. See generalIyABAANTIMUST SECTION,MONOGRAPHNO.23,TBERUzEOFREAsoN
50-62 (1999). Critical cases between Trenton Potteriesand Topco includeA1brechtv. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (stating that maximum resale price maintenance is per se
unlawful); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967) (stating that

confining sales to franchised retailers is per so unlawful); Klor's,Inc. v. Broadway-HaleStores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (finding group boycott per se unlawful); Northern Pac.Ry.Co.
v. UnitedStates,356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (finding product tying arrangement per se unlawful); and
UnitedStates v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 219 (1940) (determining that price

fixing by competitors is per se unlawful).
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Figure 1B:

Traditional Categories of
Vertical Restraints

In a trilogy of cases in the late 1970s, 6 the Court turned a comer. With
increased fervor, the Court progressively opened doors to evolving theories
of economic efficiency, swiftly abandoning the attitude expressed so vividly
in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.:'
6. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979) (holding that
issuance of blanket licenses is not form of price fixing and is not per se unlawful); National
Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (holding that whether
proceeding under per se or rule of reason, antitrust inquiry is confined to consideration of
impact on competitive conditions); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
58 (1977) (overruling per so rule inArnold,Schwinn & Co. and calling for judgment under rule
of reason standard). The trend back towards reliance on the rule of reason under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, arguably followed from the Supreme Court's 1974 decision
in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), an acquisition challenge

under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, in which the Court demonstrated an

increased interest in overcoming formalistic legal rules in favor of economic analysis of conduct
challenged under the antitrust laws.
7. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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Withouttheperse rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them
in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and
illegalunderthe ShermanAct. Should Congress'ultimately determinethat

predictabilityisunimportantin this area ofthe law, it can, ofcourse, make
per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to
ramblethroughthe
wilds ofeconomictheoryinordertomaintain aflexible
8

approach

The Court's new decisions relied on the "flexible approach" of the rule of
reason as anfitrust's first principle, and considered per se rules the exception

rather than the rule? "[D]epartare fromthe rule of reason," the Court declared
in ContinentalT.V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,Inc.,"° "mustbe based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than... formalistic line drawing.""
This return to the rule of reason, however, brought antitrust law full
circle to confront the unanswered questions in classic rule of reason cases like
Standard Oil Co. v. United States 2 and Chicago Board of Trade v. United

States. 3 What factors are relevant to the rule of reason inquiry? How are the
factors to be weighted relative to one another? And how are burdens of proof
to be allocated among the plaintiff and the defendant? Recent cases and
enforcement guidelines have begun focusing more intently on these pressing
issues and needs of antiftust law. 4
8.

United States v. TopcoAssocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,609-10 n.10 (1972). The contrast

only five years later in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), is

extraordinary.
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social
utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive
consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences
must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the
generalization may arise, but aper se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are
not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to
identify them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system
of the more complex rule-of-reason trials... but those advantages are not sufficient
in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of
antitrust law would be reduced toper se rules, thus introducing an unintended and
undesirable rigidity in the law.
Id. at 50 n.16 (citations omitted).
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (citing 1970s trilogy of cases).
10. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,58-59 (1977).
12. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
13. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
14. For a recent and comprehensive evaluation of the current state of the rule of reason,
see Symposium, The FutureCourse of the Rule ofReason, 68 ANTIRUST L.J. 331 (2000).
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The rise of this new rule of reason also signaled increased reliance on
economic concepts, such as market power, efficiency, and conditions of
entry - all of which are best introduced into evidence through an economist. 5

Once shunned as an exercise in "rambling through the wilds of economic
theory," antitrust analysis integrated with economic concepts has increasingly
become the norm, the expectation, rather than the exception. Today, antitrust
offenses previously separated by traditional categorization are more likely to
be grouped based ontheir tendencyto leadto one oftwo sorts of anti-competitive consequences. "Collusive" effects cases focus on the challenged conduet's potential to raise prices directly, restrict output, or otherwise alter competitive conditions. "Exclusionary" effects cases focus instead on the conduct's potential to indirectly confer power over price or competition through
the exclusion or impairment of a rival. The evolution of this new organizational scheme is well underway.' 6
Other factors also have enhanced the forensic role of economists. With
increased demand has come increased supply. Indeed, the number of economic consulting firms specializing in litigation support and expert testimony
has exploded." As Professors Jonathan Baker and Daniel Rubinfeld have
pointed out, improved technology also has been a factor, significantly lowering the cost of complex econometric analysis and thereby expanding its availability for use in litigation. 8
However, the centrality of economic concepts and the increased availability of expert economic testimony have caused antitrust law to collide with
a contemporary development in the law of evidence - the emergence of the
"DaubertGate." As interpreted in Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,
15. See Andrew L Gavil, After Daubert: Discerningthe IncreasinglyFine Line Between
theAdmissibiliyandSufflciency ofExpertTestimony inAntifrstLitigation,65 ANTfRUSTL.J.

663, 699-702 (1997) (discussing increased reliance on testimony by economists in antitrust
litigation); see also Yee Wah Chin, Use ofEconomic Expert Witnesses in AntitrustLitigation,

1088 PLI/Colp. 129, 131 (1998) (listing thirteen areas where economic testimony may be
useful in antitrust litigation); GEORGEA. HAY, THE ECONOMST AS ExPERT WrrEss, in EXPERT

WmTNESSES 335, 341-45 (F. Rossi, ed. 1991) (discussing demand for expert testimony by
economists in antitrust litigation).
16. For a further discussion ofthis evolution, saeAndrewL Gavil, Copperweld2000: The
VanishingGapBetween Sections I and 2 ofthe ShermanAct, 68 ANTITRUST LJ.87 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Michael J. Mandel, Goingfor the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses,
J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 1999, at 114-16 (discussing increased demand for and supply of
economists as expert witnesses).
18.

See Jonathan B. Baker &Daniel L. Rubinfeld,Empir'calMethodsinAntitrustLitiga-

tion: Review and Critique,6 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 386,386-91 (1999) (identifying improved
technology, reduced cost, and increased interest from courts as factors explaining growth in use
of economics in litigation); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in FTC v.
Staples, 18 3. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 11, 18-20 (1999) (discussing role of econometric
studies in merger analysis).
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Inc.," Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now demands a more searching, complex,
and extended inquiry to determine the relevance and reliability of all sorts of
proffered expert testimony, including economics." Because greater reliance
on economic concepts in lieu of formalized legal categories means greater
reliance on economists, antitrust cases frequently rise or fall based on the
admissibility of economic testimony. Given the dependency of the new antitrust on economic concepts and economic witnesses, its future course will
most surely be influenced by the new law of admissibility.
This Article explores the early results of the interaction of the new antitrust paradigm with the even newer law of admissibility of experts. That
interaction is increasingly evident in reports of frequent and vigorous Daubert
challenges to economic expert testimony, extensive briefings, lengthy
"Dauberthearings," and painstaking judicial evaluation of economic testimony. But it is as yet uncertain whether the considerable effort being devoted
to the Daubertprocess is in fact yielding '"better" antitrust decision making.
Part II of this Article further explores the current state of antitrust law.
Its principal hypothesis is that whereas economics is shaping antitrust doctrines today, antitrust law continues to exert a constraint on any total transformation of antitrust from a legal to an economic discipline. This give and take
between antitrust law and economics has created something of an inherent and
persistent tension in antitrust analysis that is often revealed in the interactions
of economists and lawyers. Part H examines the intersection of antitrust law
and the Daubert/JoinerKumhoTire line of admissibility decisions. It argues
that, at least theoretically, the injection ofDaubertinto antitrust legal analysis
was timely and fortuitous and provided antitrust law with a critical vehicle for
exposing and resolving doctrinal conflicts brought about by tensions emanating from the intersection of antitrust law and economics. However, Daubert
in practice tends to mask aspects of that tension. Moreover, it has generated
a new tension of its own as courts seek to differentiate admissibility from
21 with its instruction
sufficiency issues. And Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
that lower courts develop appropriate criteria of reliability for all forms of
expert methodology, may expect too much ofthe judicial process.
To further illustrate and support the arguments developed in Parts II and
I, Part IV explores three antitrust case studies relating to market power,
19. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). To the extent
Daubertitself failed to address the applicability of Rule 702 to "soft" science, such as economics, see Gavil, supra note 15, at 679-80 (discussing applicability of Daubert to economic testi-

mony), the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,526 U.S.
137 (1999), makes clear that the gatekeeper role set forth in Daubert "applies to all expert
testimony." Id. at 147.
21. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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conspiracy, and damages. Each of these areas has attracted a great deal of
Daubert attention, and each plays a critical role in many litigated antitrust
cases. But has the introduction of Daubertimproved outcomes?
The article concludes with a question and a challenge: Is Dauberttestable? First, is it fair to ask what costs and benefits are associated with implementingDaubert?The policy behind Rule 702- as reinterpreted in Daubertwas to improve judicial decision-making by identifsrng and excluding unreliable expertise from consideration. Is it in fact weeding out unreliable economics in antitrust law?
Even ifit is, there may be alternative, more cost-effective means of achieving the same goals. The "cost-benefit" question simply cannot be answered in
a vacuum. The principal alternative for weeding out unreliable economics
before Daubert was summary judgment. Therefore, a second question is
posed: Taking into account costs and benefits, have we improved antitrust
judicial decision-making through the introduction ofDaubert-stylescreening?
My preliminary conclusion is that we have not, but that more systematic
study is needed. Daubert'scosts to date appear to be enormous, and rarely do
they supplant the cost of summary judgment. We are, in effect, paying twice
for what we used to pay once in the context of summary judgment alone. So
Daubert'scosts to date appear to far outweigh its benefits, particularly when
compared to the use of summaryjudgment for similar purposes.
ff. The CurrentState ofAntitrust Law andEconomics
Antitrust law has traveled quite a distance in the last quarter century.
With the flexibility of the "constitutional" Sherman Act in tow,' the law has
collectively moved away from reliance on rigid presumptions - some rebuttable, 23 some not24 - in favor of more fact-intensive, concept-driven inquiries
across a broad range of antitrust sensitive conduct. There can be no doubting
the increased role of economics in that process. Where the Court once feared
to tread, it now eagerly and persistently ventures, entertaining arguments
about concepts inspired by the economic, as well as the "econo-legal" litera22.

See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As a

charter of freedom the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found
to be desirable in constitutional provisions."); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,20-21

(1997) (discussing common law nature of Sherman Act).

23. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,363 (1963) (noting
that increased concentration and significant post-merger market shares together create rebuttable

presumption that merger will substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act).
24.

Per se rules, as a general matter, are examples of irrebuttable presumptions. Once

invoked, defenses are barred. E. THOMAS SULnAVAN&HERBERTHOVENKAMP,ANIrRUSTLAW,
PoiCYAND PROCEDURE 189 (4th ed. 1999).
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ture, such as market power, efficiency,' and economic "plausibility. 2

In

doing so, the Court has allowed economic leaning to constrain the law ina
variety of ways, to temper its attraction for certainty in favor of greater

perceived rationality.
This is not to say that per se rules have vanished from the antitrust landscape or lost their utility. Neither is it to suggest that "economics rules." In

important ways, per se rules, and other forms of"abbreviated" analysis, persist,
and in important ways 'law" still constrains economics, just as economics has
come to constrain the law. It appears clear, however, that the categorization

scheme that evolved over antitrust's first century, which sought to pigeon hole
various restraints of trade into readily identifiable categories, no longer drives
antitrustlaw. Courts turn with less frequency to "horizontal" and vertical" and
their various sub-strata to divine the applicable antitrust rule of decision.
Instead, these categories have slowly been replaced by an as yet not fully
articulated alternate model, which derived from particular theories of anti-

competitive effect.
A. Economics Constrainsthe Law

Sylvania and BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.' opened the doors to a
radical reconsideration of how we analyze .both vertical and horizontal arrangements under the Sherman Act.2 By the time the Court decided Sylvania

in 1977, it had banned virtually all vertical agreements, whether affecting
intrabrand or interbrand competition, as per se violations. Vertical intrabrand
price agreements, both mininum3 ° and maximum, 31 were per se unlawful.
25. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 787-89 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing role of market power in Sherman Act Section 1 analysis). See, e.g., FTC v.
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,461 (1986) (discussing role ofmarket power); NCAAv.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,109 n.38 (1984) (defining market power).
26. See, e.g., CaliforniaDentalAss'n,527 U.S. at 771-73 (discussing possible procompetifive reasons for advertising restrictions); Khan, 522 U.S. at 15-17 (discussing procompetitive uses of maximum resale price maintenance); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S.
1, 20-22 (1979) (discussing efficiencies of blanket licensing); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,54-55 (1977) (discussing efficiency advantages of non-price vertical

restraints).
27. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986) (rejecting plaintiffs' claims on grounds of economic implausibility).
28. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
29. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
30. See Doctor iles Med. Co. v. John D. Park& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,408 (1911)
(stating that vertical infrabrand price agreements to establish minimum resale prices are per sc
unlawfid under common law and Sherman Act).
31. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (finding that maximum resale
price fixing is per se violation of Sherman Act).
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Vertical intrabrandnon-price agreements were per se unlawful as well. 32 On

the interbrand side of things, tying was per se unlawful, 33 and, although the
per se moniker was never affixed to exclusive dealing, it too could be readily
condemned under fairly minimal criteria." The horizontal side of antitrust

was just as dependent on per se rules. Price fixing by competitors, obviously

the most defensible of the per se rules, was per se unlawfu3 as were the division of markets3 6 and all manner of "group boycotts."37
At a startling pace, however, many ofthese per se rules have gone by the

wayside, or at least have been severely curtailed. Sylvania, of course, abandoned the use of per se rules for vertical, intrabrand, non-price restraints.

Twenty years later, the Court abandoned the per se rule for vertical, intrabrand
maxmum price restraints."' These decisions leave only minimum resale price
maintenance subject to the per se rule. 9 On the interbrand side ofthings, the
Court has significantly eroded the per so status of tying, and the Court may
soon take the opportunity to abandon it altogether.' Exclusive dealing also
32. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,379 (1967) (finding that
per se violation of Sherman Act occurs when manufacturer sells products to its distributor

subject to territorial restrictions upon resale).
33. See Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,498 (1969) (finding
that tying agreements are per se unlawful under Sherman Act); Northern Pao. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (same).
34. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,334 (1961) (adopting sub-

stantiality standard but finding that arrangement did not foreclose sufficient enough volume of
competition to be illegal under Sherman Act); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,

314 (1949) (finding that arrangement is illegal when competition has been foreclosed in relatively modest share of line of commerce affected).
35. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,218 (1940) (stating that
"for over forty years, this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle
that price-fixing arrangements are unlawfulper se under the Sherman Act").
36. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (finding that
horizontal division of markets is per se violation of Sherman Act).
37. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,212 (1959) (stating that
Sherman Act has long forbidden group boycotts).
38. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,15 (1997) (overrulingAlbrechtv. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145 (1968), and holding that vertically imposed maximum prices are not per so
violation of Sherman Act).
39. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988)
(noting that "vertical agreements on resale prices" are per se illegal); Monsanto Co. v. -SprayRite Sere.Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) (refusing to inquire whether per so rule against
minimum resale price maintenance should be reconsidered). Although both decisions reassert
the continued vitality of the per so rule against minimum resale price maintenance, they also

seriously elevate the burden of proving the existence of such an agreement, which in turn has
diminished the scope ofthe per so rule.
40. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,464 (1992)
(adopting qualified per so rule for tying), Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2,13-14 (1984) (same). Whereas the majorities in both cases paid homage to the traditional per

57 WASH-. &LEE L. REV 831 (2000)
has moved further away from harsh treatment, with courts demanding increas-

ingly higher levels of proof from plaintiffs challenging their use.41

Horizontal agreements have also undergone a sea change. Although horizontal price fixing remains firmly per se unlawful, it remains so only when it

is presented inthe most stark context oftrue cartel behavior.4' The Court has
distinguished "literal' price fixing from per se unlawful price fixing in cases

like BroadcastMusic, and has divided sharply over invocation of the per se
rule in more complex settings." Although horizontal division of markets also

remains firmly in the per se camp, it too has been implicitly limited to the
most stark cases.'

Many commentators, and some courts, have argued per-

suasively that whereas Topco stands for a vital legal principle - division of
markets by competitors is per se unlawful - the facts of Topco would no
in light of subsequent cases, especially
longer be subjected
45 to that principle

BroadcastMusic.

These developments over the last quarter century have been driven by
two critical insights gleaned from economics and economic commentary:

(1) firms lacking market power cannot successfully effectuate anti-competitive
restraints of trade; and (2) many market arrangements that facially appear to
restrain trade in some way may in fact achieve valuable efficiencies. By
failing to take these two factors into account, the categorical approach to

antitrust prevalent in 1977 when Sylvania was decided seriously overdeterred
competitively neutral and even beneficial conduct.

Indeed, there is little

debate today that the legal superstructure that existed just prior to Sylvania
was unsupportable. However, this is all familiar antitrust history today. The

more pressing question is what has replaced the old structure.
so rule, they also superimposed a more modern "market power" screen on its use. See id. at 35
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating abandonment of per se rule against tying).
concurring) (arguing that Court
41. SeeJeffersonParish,466 U.S. at 44-46 (O'Connor, J.,
should sustain exclusive dealing arrangement under rule ofreason). See, e.g., Omega Envtl., Inc.
v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to find illegal arrangement
where evidence shows increasing output, decreasing prices, and significantly fluctuating market
shares among major manufacturers), cert denied, 525 U.S. 812 (1998); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F2d 589, 597 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that to successfully show illegal
exclusive dealing, plaintiff must show proof of substantial foreclosure and "probable immediate
and future effects" (quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,329 (1961))).
42. See generallyJTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir.
1999).
43. See generally Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (applying per so rule to maximum fee schedule agreed to by medical service providers by single vote

margin).
44.
45.

See generally, e.g., Palmer v. BRO of Ceorgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46(1990).
See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,229 (D.C.

Cir. 1986) (stating that Topco was "effectively overruled... as to the per so illegality of all

horizontal restraints" by subsequent decisions).
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B. The Evolving Paradigm- Anti-Competitive Effects andAntitrustRules
Today, antitrust cases can be divided into two categories that are defined
by the direct or indirect nature of the anti-competitive effects associated with
the challenged conduct. In contrast to the legalistic categories of the last
century - horizontal, vertical, etc. - these categories flow from the economic
basis for challenging the specified conduct. In "collusive" effects cases, the
defendants are accused of engaging in conduct that directly evidences the
exercise of market power. Horizontal mergers, whether based on unilateral
or coordinated effects theories, horizontal price fixing, divisions of markets,
and some group boycotts are examples of collusive effects cases.46 However,
virtually all vertical intrabrand restraints also would be placed under the
collusive effects banner because today they are likely to be viewed as anticompetitive only in the rare circumstances in which either the supplier has
market power and the use of Sylvania-type restrictions is likely to lead to
higher consumer prices or filitate dealer or supplier cartels.47
In contrast to these collusive effects cases are "exclusionary" effect
cases.'
Exclusionary effects cases concern efforts to obtain power over
markets by excluding or otherwise disabling rivals and so are indirectly anticompetitive. These kinds of cases are distinguished by their immediate consequences for competitors and their inferential consequences for competition.
As rivals are injured, the ability of the predator to exercise market power
is enhanced. Examples include not only all vertical intebrand restraints,
but also exclusionary group boycotts and virtually all conduct challenged
under49Section 2 of the Sherman Act as monopolization or attempts to monopolize.
46.

See generally FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawycrs Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (illus-

frating typical collusive effects of group boycott).
47. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-27 (1988)
(discussing use of vertical restraints to facilitate cartelizing); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v.
Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing potential for higher prices
where manufacturer imposing vertical non-price restraints has very large market share).
48. Not all collusive effects are unlawful under the antitrust laws. Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, for example, a firm that simply raises prices may not be guilty of monopolization.
We accept the collusive effects of "monopoly" absent some evidence that it was achieved or
maintained through exclusionary means. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416,429 (2d Cir. 1945) (distinguishing "monopoly" from "monopolization").
49. There are exceptions. "Invitations to collude" exemplify practices that have collusive

effects, yet may be challenged as attempted monopolization. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that Microsoft's proposal to
Netscape to divide internet browser market was sufficient to find Microsoft liable for attempted
monopolization); United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
1984) (finding that invitation to competitor to collude may support charge of attempted monop-

olization).
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Figure 2:
The Evolving Paradigm: Categorizing Antitrust
Violations By Their Anticompetitive Effects

Exclusionary Effects

Collusive Effects
* Price Fixing by Competitors
" Division of Markets by
Competitors
" Collusive Group Boycotts
" Some Competitor Collaborations
" Most Horizontal Mergers (unilateral and coordinated effects)
" All Vertical Interbrand, Price
& Non-Price Restraints

Exclusionary Group Boycotts
• Some Competitor Collaborations
• All Interbrand Vertical Restraints
• Most Section 2 Offenses
* Price & Non-Price Predation
• All Price Discrimination
• Vertical Mergers
*

Although there is some significant overlap between the evidence used to
assess collusive and exclusionary effects cases, there are also some important
differences. Collusive effects cases turn rather quickly to evidence that the
colluding firms will be in a position to exercise market power. Such evidence
can be direct, inthe form of evidence of an actual restriction in output, or it can
be indirect, in the form of market definition and market share calculation. 0 In
either instance, however, the evidence will remain focused on the structure of
the relevant market and the direct effects of the challenged conduct on price,
output, and other conditions like quality and variety typically determined by
competition. Exclusionary effects cases also can be based on direct or circumstantial evidence and require an inquiry into the structure ofthe market. But
they will first and foremost focus on the tendency of the conduct to exclude
rivals.52 Increasingly, they are also concerned with the likelihood that the
50. See Gavil, supra note 16, at 99-102 (discussing roles of direct and indirect evidence in
proving monopoly power). See, e.g., Toys R' Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 936-37 (7th Cir.
2000) (finding thattoy retailerwas in position to exercise market power based on boycott's actual
effect in reducing output of toy manufacturers as well as market share); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v.
Realty One, Inc., 173 F3d 995,1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that monopoly power may be proved
either by direct or indirect evidence and discussing facts and circumstances supplying both).
51. See Omega Envtl. v. Oilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157,1162-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (evaluating evidence of exclusive dealing).
52. See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (stating that in determining whether conduct is
anticompetitive, threshold question is whether conduct restricts or threatens to restrict ability
of other firms to compete in marketplace on their own merits).
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alleged predator will be able to raise prices in the post-exclusionary conduct
period. Thus, "direct" evidence might consist of evidence of actual exclusion
or increased costs to the rival. "Indirect" or "circumstantial" evidence might
focus on the structure of the market and the degree to which the challenged
conduct "foreclosed" access to inputs or markets. 3
The critical point today is that cases which share a common theory of
anti-competitive effects are more likely to be tried alike and treated alike. A
"vertical" case involving allegedly exclusionary interbrand restraints will have
much more in common economically with a monopolization case under Section 2 of the Sherman Act than it will with a vertical intrabrand restraint, even
though both traditionally were termed "vertical." Similarly, a "horizontal"
group boycott that directly seeks to coerce higher prices, as was the case in
FTC v. SuperiorCourtTrialLawyers Ass 'n,' has much more in common with
other collusive effects cases, such as horizontal divisions ofmarkets and price
fixing, than it does with exclusionary group boycotts, like those involved in
Northwest Wholesale Stationers,Inc. v. PacificStationeryandPrintingCo.,
even though both traditionally would have been pigeon-holed as horizontal
"concerted refusals to deal."
Although the evolution towards this bipolar model is still incomplete, it is
well underway. And itcomplicatesthe "per se vs. rule ofreason" debate in ways
that have yetto fully crystalize. While there clearly may be roles to play for per
se and abbreviated rules on either side ofthe equation, their roles are unlikely
any longer to turn on characterizations such as "horizontal" and "vertical."
One characteristic ofthis "new antitrust paradigm," however, appears to
be well entrenched: itis dependent upon economics and economists. It is difficult to imagine undertaking a responsible effort to prosecute or defend an
antitrust case today without at least retaining a consulting economist. First and
foremost, the plaintiff must establish a coherent theory of anti-competitive
effects, collusive, exclusionary or both. Butthetheoryalonewillnotbe enough.
Assembling sufficient proof to support or defeat the theory will invariably take
the parties down the road of economic analysis and expert testimony.
These fundamental changes in antitrust reached something of an apexjust
as increased concern about "junk science" in the courts led the Supreme Court
in Daubertto a reformulation of the methodology used to apply Federal Rule
of Evidence 702. The Daubert/JoinerKumhoTire trilogy thus arrived on the
scene and crossed paths with antitrust at a critical juncture in its history.
Increased reliance on economics meant increased reliance on economists, but
53.

See id. at 37-44 (discussing conduct of software manufacturer and finding it to be

anticompetitive based on both direct and circumstantial evidence).
54. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
55. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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economists typically testify as "experts" subject to the admissibility constraints of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This crossing of paths already has
had a profound impact on the litigation of antitrust claims, and it may well

dictate the terms on which the economics of antitrust's new paradigm are
debated and litigated.
IL The Intersection ofAntitrust Law andthe FederalRules ofEvidence
A. Stage 1: Antitrust andDaubert Before Kumho Tire
Daubert took antitrust law somewhat by surprise. Prior to Daubert,

issues relating to the quality of expert economic evidence in antitrust cases

tended to be resolved through summary judgment or judgment as a matter of

law. 6 After Daubert,but before Kumho Tire,the increasing incidence of reliance on experts in antitrust cases led antitrust litigators to explore Daubert's

applicability to antitrust.57 Those attempts to integrate Daubertinto antitrust

produced three distinct approaches in the courts.58

First, some courts applied the five Daubertfactors strictly and literally.
For these courts, failure to demonstrate methodological reliability on any of
the five Daubert grounds could justify exclusion of the expert's testimony.

Because those factors were not designed for social science generally and
seemed largely unworkable for economics, the "strict and literal" approach
invariably led to exclusion of the expert, which in turn often led to summary
judgment.5 9 This approach also ignored Daubert's admonition that the five
56. See IIPILiPE.AREEDAETAL., ANTiRUSTLAw 125-36 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing
use of summary judgment to control testimony of expert economists); Gavil, supra note 15, at

688-98 (discussing use of summary judgment to resolve expert admissibility issues prior to
Daubert). See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
232 (1993) (finding evidence insufficient to warrant submission to jury); Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,461-79 (1992) (concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
n.19 (1986) (noting district court's determination that mathematical expert's opinion testimony
was inadmissible).
57. Daubert listed five criteria to guide the courts in assessing the relevance and reliability
of expert methodology- (1) whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested;
(2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;"
(3) "the known or potential rate of error" of a particular scientific technique; (4) the "existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation;" and (5) the "general
acceptance" of the theory or technique in the relevant scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
58. These arguments are explored more fully in Gavil, supranote 15, at 673-86.
59.' See generally,e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504
(N.D. Ala. 1995) (relying on strict interpretation of Dauberttest to exclude testimony of economist and statistician and subsequently granting summary judgment for defendants), rev'd, 158
F3d 548 (1lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 309 (1999).
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cited factors were not intended to be exhaustive and limiting.' °
A second approach seemed equally rigid, and constituted something of
a "converse-literal approach": Because Daubert dealt solely with hard science, and the Court appeared to limit its ruling to the facts before it,' Daubert
does not apply at all to 'technical or other specialized knowledge." This

approach was only embraced by one district court 2 and was specifically

rejected as untenable by others.' Like the literal approach, the converse liter-

al approach had predictable, albeit opposite consequences: admission of the
expert's testimony.
Finally, a third and more flexible approach emerged and became the
consensus view prior to Kumho Tire. Finding express support in Daubert,this

approach recognized that the specifics of economic testimony will vary with
each case, and that the question of methodological reliability may demand the

use of different criteria of reliability as the need arises.' This "designer
admissibility" concept ultimately proved an accurate reading of the Court's
intentions in Daubert,as later embellished in Kumho Tire.

For a time, there was serious conflict in the circuits on how, if at all,
Daubertshould be integrated into antitrust. But with increasing frequency
during that time, courts, litigators, and commentators became aware that
"Dauberthearings" were here to stay in antitrust. 6
60. See Daubert,509 U.S. at 593 ('"Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.").
61. See id. at 590 n.8 ("Rule 702 also applies to 'technical, or other specialized knowledge.' Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the

expertise offered here.").
62. Bell AtI. Bus. Sys. Servs. v. Ifitachi Data Sys. Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH-)
171,259 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
63. See Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (S.D. Ohio 1996)
("Neither economics or [sic] statistics seems to completely qualify as 'scientific knowledge....'
[Nevertheless] the reasoning of Daubert still applies" and its "general framework ... applies
to all expert testimony."); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497,
1505-06 (D. Kan. 1995) ("The Court has no doubt that Daubert requires it to act as a gatekeeper, to determine whether [the] testimony and report are reliable and relevant under Rule
702.").
64. Cf.Tyus v. Urban SearchManagement, 102 F3d256,263 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
Daubert applies to social science experts, as well as those in the "hard" sciences). See, e.g.,
Louis Trauth Dairy, 925 F. Supp. at 1252 ("The Court must decide if the proffered testimony
is based upon valid economic, statistical or econometric methodologies and reasoning that can
properly be applied to the facts of this case."); Aluminum Phosphide, 893 F. Supp. at 1506
(deciding that testimony of economist is not admissible because expert intended "not to supply
specialized knowledge, but to plug evidentiary holes in plaintiff's case, to speculate, and to

surmise").
65. For a discussion ofthe "Dauberthearing" during this period, through the eyes of two
testifying economists, see Roger D. Blair, Lessonsfrom City of Tuscaloosa, 10 ANTITRUST 43
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B. Stage Two: Moving Beyond Daubert's Five Factors
Kumho Tire put to rest two debates over Daubert'sapplicability to anti-

trust experts. First, it clearly rejected the "Daubertonly applies to hard
science" view, unqualifiedly concluding that "Daubert'sgeneral holding setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation - applies not
only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based
on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge."' Second, it rejected the
literal application approach as to the five Daubertfactors:
We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more 'ofthe specific factors that Daubertmentioned when doing so will help determine
that testimony's reliability. However, as the Court stated in Daubert,the
test of reliability is "flexible," and Daubert'slist of specific factors neither
necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts in every case.67
Although the specific Daubertfactors might be relevant criteria for determining the reliability of proffered expert testimony, they also might not. The
(1996) and Peter BronsteenMyDaywith Daubert, 10 ANTrRUST41 (1996). Other treatments
of Daubertspecific to antitrust include: Shubha Ghosh, Federal and State Resolutions of the
ProblemofDaubert and Technicalor OtherScientific Knowledge,' 22 AM. J. TRIALADVOC.
237 (1998); Christopher B. Hockett & Frank M. Hinman, Does DaubertRaise a New Barrier
to Entry for Economists?, 10 ANTITRUST 40 (1996); Robert F. Lanzillotti, Coming to Terms
With Daubert in ShermanAct Complaints:A Suggested EconomicApproach, 77 NEB. L. REV.
83 (1998); Charles D. Weller, Antitrust Economics as Science After Daubert, 42 ANTITRUST
BULL. 871 (1997).
66. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,141 (1999); see also id. at 147 ("The
initial question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies only to 'scientific'
testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the parties, believe that it applies to all expert
testimony."). To the extent pre-Kumho Tire decisions read Daubertnarrowly as not applying
to economics, it is fair to infer the Court's view that economics was not "scientific" in the same
sense as epidemiology, the area of expert testimony at issue in Daubert. But such a distinction
may have placed too much weight on the area of expertise, as opposed to the particular methodology being utilized by the expert. Arguably, there are more and less "scientific" aspects to
methodologies typically relied upon in a variety of disciplines. The "nature of the explanation"
would appear to matter more than the "area of expertise," for purposes of defining an expert's
testimony as "scientific" or not In any event, it would appear that Kumho Tire puts to rest any
implicit need to assess whether economics, or any other discipline, should be broadly characterized as "scientific," as opposed to "technical or other specialized knowledge," for purposes of
Rule 702. The mandate is clean All expert testimony should be evaluated for its relevance and
reliability under criteria appropriate to the given discipline.
67. Id. at 141.
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability
of the factors mentioned in Daubert,nor can we now do so for subsets of cases
categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends upon
the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.
Id. at 150.
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district court judge, therefore, is assigned the task of selecting the criteria of

reliability,' subject to reversal only for abuse of discretion. 9
Kumho Tire, considered together with Daubert and General Electric
Co. v. Joiner,70 arguably creates a three stage procedure for the trial court

judge and the parties. 7' First, each area of an expert's proposed testimony
must be isolated and identified. 72 Second, expert testimony that involves
distinct methodological judgments or steps must be isolated and identified.73

Finally, together with the parties, the district court judge must identify appropriate criteria of reliability for each methodological step and reach a conclusion about the reliability of the testimony. The decision process can be
depicted as follows:

68. Id. at 152.
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an
expert's reliability, and to decide whether and when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether
or not the expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in Joinermakes clear
that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it "review[s]
a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony."... That standard
applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as
to its ultimate conclusion.... Thus, whctherDaubert's specific factors are, or are

not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law
grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.
Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,138-39 (1997)).
69. Id.; see also id. at 1171 ("Mhe law grants a district court the same broad latitude

when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability
determination." (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997))). But see New

York v. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202 F3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (viewing exclusion of
expert's testimony on antitrust damages as "mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo
review").
70.522 U.S. 136,138-39 (1997).
71.For a thoughtful, pre-Kumho Tire discussion of the procedural challenges that Daubert
unleashed, see Margaret A. Berger, ProceduralParadigmsfor Appying the Daubert Test, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994).
72.In antitrust, for example, the plaintiff might retain a single expert to define relevant
markets, evaluate market power, and address the anti-competitive effects of the defendant's
alleged conduct Each area would have to be compartmentalized in the first stage of the
Daubert/Joiner/KumhoTire reliability evaluation.
73.Again using the example of antitrust, an expert testifying to the relevant market will have

proceeded through a number of steps in formulating her opinion, each step involving potential
methodological choices. For example, the expert might have adopted a methodology for
determining which products are in and out of the market This in turn might have required her
to make some methodological elections regarding the propriety of her relying on available
evidence of cross-elasticities. Also, in calculating market share, she would have to make
methodological choices based on her assessment ofthe available data.
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Figure 3:
Daubertand Antitrust After Kumho Tire:
The Three Stages of Designer Admissibility

Stage 1

Stage 2

Isolate & Identify
Each Area of
Expert Testimony

Stage 3

Identify Each Piece of Proposed Testimony that Requires
Distinct Methodology

Identify Criteria of
Reliability for Each
MethodologicalStep
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Although these three stages are relatively easy to synthesize and may be
easy to execute in some instances, they will surely provoke a daunting set of
tasks for most antitrust cases. For example, the sheer number ofmethodological judgments involved in the process of defining a relevant market or in using
regression analysis to establish a damage model can be considerable. Identifying each and every such step will be difficult. Moreover, the task of identifying criteria of reliability for each methodological step can be costly, time
consuming, and of doubtful consequences. Often it will simply reveal that the
expert made ' judgment calls" at various points in her analysis. Indeed, in
most seriously litigated antitust cases, responsible economists can be found
to differ on the most fundamental issues, largely owing to differences in their
judgment. Kumho Tire appears to invite the parties and the district court to
parse those judgment calls as a matter of admissibility.74
74.

Although language in Daubert suggested the contrary, 509 U.S. at 590 & n.9, the

Kumho Tire Court also seemed to view the expert's applicationof methodology to the facts of

the case as a distinct methodological step to be evaluated as part of the Daubert process:
"[W]here [expert] testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their applicationare
called sufficiently into question,... the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has 'a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.'" Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,149 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 592 (1993) (emphasis added); see also id. at 157 ("'[N]othing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit ofthe expert."") (quotingJoiner,522 U.S. at 146). Although this extension
ofDaubertto application would appear to be in derogation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, see
Gavil, supra note 15, at 682-85, it is reflected in the pending revisions to Rule 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of opinion or otherwise, if.
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principlesand methods reliably to thefacts of
the case.
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Another critical aspect of the three stage process concerns the relative
burdens of proof on the parties. As a general matter, it is well settled that the
party proffering a particular piece of evidence has the burden of establishing its
admissibility." But, as a practical matter, how can that burden be assessed in
the context ofDaubert? Presumably, the movant in limine who has challenged
admissibility must make some initial showing of irrelevance or unreliability. 6
But under a "flexible" approach, it is not clear that such an initial showing can
be made without first identifying the relevant criteria of reliability. Who then
bears the burden of identifying the relevant criteria of reliability?
Kumho Tire can be read to suggest that the Daubert factors remain a
useful starting point for the movant. Demonstrating lack of reliability under
the Daubert factors would seem to satisfy the movant's initial burden of
pointing out the deficiencies in the non-movant's evidence. That would shift
a "burden of production" to the non-movant to provide a "defense" of the
testimony, and that defense might consist of an obligation to present "countervailing factors operating in favor of admissibility." Because the burden of
establishing admissibility will at all times rest with the non-movant, typically
the proponent of the evidence, the non-movant may or will bear the burden of
persuasion, as well." That is, in identifying the relevant criteria of reliability,
the non-movant must persuade the trial judge not only that his or her alternative criteria are the right criteria, but also that his or her expert's testimony
is reliable when judged by that criteria. This allocation of burdens can be
gleaned from the Court's description and apparent approval of the district
court's approach:
Finally, the court, after looking for a defense of [the expert's] methodology as applied in these circumstances, found no convincing defense.
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added). These revisions were approved by the Supreme
Court on April 17,2000 and will become effective December 1, 2000. H.R. Doe. No. 106-225
(2000).
75.
1 PAUL C. GLANsIn& EDWARD . IMWINKELu ED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-7(A),

at 35 (3d ed. 1999) ("As with most evidence issues, the burden of persuasion on the admissibility issue rests with the proponent of the evidence."); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.1O
(noting that proponent of evidence must establish admissibility by "preponderance of proof').

'76.

This can be likened to the initial showing required of a movant for summary judgment

who will not bear the burden of proof at triaL According to the Supreme Court, even though

such a movant need not satisfy a burden ofprool he or she must make some initial showing that
they are entitled to summary judgment by identifying with some particularity the deficiencies

in the non-movant's evidence. The non-movant must then demonstrate that he or she will be
able to meet a burden of production. See 11 MooRE's FEDRAL PRAcrcE § 56.13 (3d ed.
1997) (outlining parties' burdens of production and persuasion upon motion for summary judgment).

77.

See supra note 74.

57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 831 (2000)
Rather, it found (1) that "none" of the Daubertfactors, including that of
'general acceptance' inthe relevant expert community, indicated that [the
expert's] testimony was reliable... ; (2) that its own analysis "revealedno
countervailingfactors operatingin favor of admissibilitywhich could
outweigh those identifiedin DaubMt"... ; and (3)that the "partiesidentified no such factorsin theirbriefs,....

The Court concluded: "And the [district] court ultimately based its decision
upon [the expert's] failure to satisfy either Daubert'sfactors or any other set
of reasonable reliability criteria. In light of the record as developed by
the parties, that conclusion was within the District Court's lawful discre79
tion."
The challenge then is to chart each expert's proposed testimony, methodological step by methodological step, providing indicia of reliability at every
juncture. Ironically, the expert probably will be the one best able both to
advise counsel and testify as to the criteria of reliability appropriate to judge
her own, as well as her counterpart's testimony. It is easy to envision a distinct portion of the parties' briefs and a discrete time allotted at any Daubert
hearing focused solely on identifying "criteria of reliability" for all methodological steps. But such an approach clearly will further add to the expense
and intricacy of the screening process.
A final issue presented by Kumho Tire's proposed process concerns its
extension of Joiner'sabuse of discretion standard to the district court's selection of criteria of reliability. In doing so, the Court reasoned that such selection warrants the same kind of deference and latitude as the broader decision
to admit or exclude.80 But where the decision to admit or exclude necessarily
will be a very individualized determination, the selection of criteria of reliability arguably will not be.
Admissibility decisions are analogous to "findings of fact." They are
likely to take into account the credibility ofthe experts, at least as it relates to
the reliability of their methods, as well as their specific work in the case
presented. They will, therefore, have little direct precedential value in subsequent litigation. In contrast, the criteria of reliability developed by courts and
relating to specific kinds of expert testimony are more analogous to conclusions of law.81 As courts become more adept at applying Kumho Tire, they
78. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,156 (1999) (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 158.
80. See supra note 66 (discussing Kumho Tire).
81. Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed the Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals's refusal
to apply the Daubertfactors as a legal error in Kumho Tire that warranted reversal. It made no
mention of any reversal for "abuse of discretion." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151. Likewise, a
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will presumably look to each other to develop a consistent body of criteria of

reliability that should be used for particular types of recurring expert testimony. But if those criteria are evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard, it is likely that different courts and circuits will develop distinct sets of

criteria of reliability.

2

Arguably, greater consistency in the use of experts

will be achieved if courts can develop common criteria of reliability for
various fields of expertise. That is far less likely to occur, however, if the
criteria themselves are viewed like "fact findings" subject to review only for

abuse of discretion.
lIV Three Case Studiesfrom Antitrust
It is still too early to fully assess the ramifications ofDaubertandKumho

Tire for antitrust. Remarkably, despite the considerable attention that has
been given to Daubertin antitrus circles, 3 it is often ignored by the parties
and courts or applied in a perfunctory manner. In lieu of a broad attempt at
synthesis, therefore, this section uses three recent decisions as case studies in
how the DaubertJoiner/KumhoTire line of cases is being used, perhaps

abused, and even ignored in antitrust."
district court's refusal after Kumho Tire to consider the Daubertfactors at all, or to refuse to
articulate any alternative criteria of reliability, presumably would constitute legal error, which
would not be entitled to any deference on appeal. Id.at 158.
82. 1DAviDL. FAi ANETAL.,MODENSCIENiFCEIDENCE: THE LAWAND SCINCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3.5, at 17-22 (Supp. 2000).
83. "Daubertand antitrust" presentations have become a frequent feature of bar and other
continuing legal education programs. See generaly, e.g., Yee Wah Chin, Use of Economic
Expert Witnesses in Antitrust Litigation, 1088 PLI/CoRP. 129 (1998); Frederick C. Dunbar &
J. Douglas Zona, Issues in Antitrust Economics Testimony After Daubert, 1088 PLI/CoP. 181
(1998); Virginia R. Metallo, The Impact of Daubert on Expert Testimony in Antitrust Cases,

1088 PLIICoRP. 375 (1998).
84. The three case studies were selected based on several criteria: (1) their substantial
consideration and application of Daubert to antitrust (although in one case the absence of any
mention of Daubertdespite a clear methodological conflict between the principal testifying
economists was deemed worthy of further evaluation); (2) the central role of the expert testimony in establishing the core elements of the plaintiff's case; and (3) the representativeness of
the subject of expert testimony - i.e., the likelihood that it would commonly arise in other
antitrust cases. One distinctive group of Daubertcases not discussed here concerns the role of
expert witnesses in supporting or opposing class certification in antitrust actions. See, e.g., In
re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68,74-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (examining
economic testimony in determining appropriateness of class certification in credit card case);
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 191 FlUD. 472, 486-487 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (allowing expert
opinion in form of multiple regression analysis to support request for class certification in pricefixing case); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 25-27 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (questioning whether methodology of expert in multiple regression analysis 'will comport
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A. SMS Systems, Microsoft andMonopoly Power

The resurgence ofthe rule of reason in the late 1970s set the courts about
the task of defining "anti-competitive" effects with greater clarity. That effort
soon turned to economic concepts, notably "market power." The courts were

accustomed to considering market power in other antitrust contexts, particularly monopolization and mergers."5 In fact, the working judicial definition
of monopoly power has for over forty years come from the Supreme Court's
Cellophane monopolization decision: "Monopoly power is the power to
control prices or exclude competition." 6 More recently, the Court refined the
definition to focus on a firm's or group of firms' ability to raise prices above
those that would prevail in a competitive market." Market power, so defined,

has become an increasingly necessary ingredient of Section 1, non per se
Sherman Act offenses.s
The most recent stage in the transformation of market power from an

economic to a legal concept, however, has concerned the evidentiary manner
in which it can be proved. Today, courts recognize that market power can be
proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. "Direct" evidence ofmarket
power typically will consist of evidence of its actual exercise, as in an observed
restriction of output or increase in price. Inthe absence of such direct evidence
of market power, however, litigants can rely on "indirect" or "circumstantial"
evidence, typically offered in the form of market share statistics, from which
with the basic principles of econometric theory, will have any probative value, and will
primarily use evidence that is common to all members of the proposed class"); In re Catfish
Antitrust Litig., 939 F. Supp. 493,498 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (expressing concern over novelty of
expert's economic theories in approving class action settlement).
85. See generall, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)
(considering market power in mergers); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)
(considering market power in monopolization).
86. United States v. E..du Pont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391 (1956).
87. See Gavil,supra note 16, at 102-04 (discussing relationship of monopoly and market
power). See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) ("Market power
is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market"). Although there is language in recent Supreme Court decisions suggesting that "monopoly" power
connotes something more than "market" power, see, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992), commentators and more recent court of appeals
decisions have begun to recognize that although market power is always a matter of degree,
there is no clear economic dividing line between monopoly and market power. See, e.g.,
Re/Max Intern., Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1019 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e see no
reason to believe that monopoly power in the § 1 context is any different from the § 2 monopoly
power the plaintiffs allege here.").
88. See generally Mark R. Patterson, The Role ofPowerin the Rule ofReason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 429 (2000).
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market power can be inferred. 9 Proving market power through circumstantial
evidence, in turn, requires several distinct steps. First, a "relevant market"
must be defined. Second, market shares must be calculated for the firms
accused of anti-competitive conduct. And finally, numerical thresholds must
be established to justify the inference of market power from specific market
share percentages? But whether through direct evidence of anti-competitive
effects or through indirect evidence in the form of market shares, the task of
proving market power almost invariably falls upon an expert witness.
Surprisingly, despite a great deal of consensus on the basic methodology
for defining relevant markets and calculating market shares, many cases,
depending upon market share calculations, come down to a battle between
disagreeing experts. What explains the differing opinions if the methodologies are alike? Typically, experts disagree in the application ofthose methodologies to the facts at hand.91 Thus, the extension of Daubertto application,
as is suggested in Kumho Tire and incorporated in the new Rule 702, may
trigger substantially more frequentDaubert-based challenges in antitrust cases
relying on experts to define relevant markets.'
However, in some instances, genuine methodological conflict may be at

the root of the differing testimonies, even though Daubertchallenges may not
always follow. A case in point is the recent UnitedStatesv. Microsoft Corp.'
89. See Gavil, supra note 16, at 95-102 (discussing relative weight of direct and circumstantial evidence of market power).
90. Perhaps one of the most rigorous explications of these various steps can be found in
the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
See United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDEINES, at http/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publie/guidelines/horiz book/hmgl.html (last modified Apr. 8, 1997). Here again the interplay of law and economics is notable. Arguably,
"market definition" is a legal construct designed to capture the economics of supply and demand
substitution - of elasticities - for judge and jury. It is, therefore, a method of translating an
economic concept into a workable legal one. Economists may in fact have little need for it
except in their roles as antitrust experts or policy proponents.
91. Ideological divisions, too, might explain clashes among expert economists. Richard
A. Posner, The Law and Economics ofthe Economic Expert Winess, 13 J. ECON. PERSPs. 91,
96-97 (1999). Posner stated:
A perfectly respectable economist might be an antitrust "hawk," another equally
respectable economist might be a "dove." Each might have a long list of reputable
academic publications fully consistent with systematically pro-plaintiff or prodefendant testimony, and so a judge or jury would have little basis for choosing
between them.
Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law ofEvidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477,1540 (1999) (discussing ideological divisions of expert consultant witnesses).
92. See, e.g., Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 729,730
(W.D. Va. 2000) (challenging expert testimony defining relevant markets).
93. 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000).
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litigation. One of the critical issues in the government's case was monopoly
power.9 4 The government maintained that desktop PC operating systems was
a relevant market, and that Microsoft held a monopolistic share ofthat market.
Microsoft disagreed, arguing for a far broader definition of the market. Both
sides relied upon differing combinations of direct and circumstantial evidence
to support their contentions of monopoly power. The district court largely
rejected Microsoft's position, however, finding for the government on the
question of Microsoft's dominant market position. 5
Although the defendant did not lodge a Daubert challenge, it is clear
from a comparison of the direct testimony of the experts that very fundamental - and methodological - differences underlay their disagreement over
monopoly power. The government's economist testified: "There are four
reasons why I believe that Microsoft possesses monopoly power in the PC
operating systems market."' Those reasons included: (1) its persistently
high market shares (which, of course, was derived from a market definition

limited to desktop PC operating systems); (2) barriers to entry, some caused
by network effects and others by lack of program stock for competing operating systems; (3) conduct that would not be profitable unless done by a
monopolist; and (4) a pattern of uncompetitive prices, persistently high
profits, and the high value of Microsoft's equity.' Microsoft's expert responded, however, with a decidedly methodological criticism, asserting that
the government's economists "have concluded wrongly that Microsoft has
monopoly power over the operating systems because they have relied on
textbook theoriesof competition thatdo not apply to, or explain the dynamics
' This, he argued, was evident in
of, the microcomputer software industry."98
their failure to consider several factors: (1) low entry barriers; (2) evidence
of intense competition and product innovation; (3) a pattern of competitive
conduct; and (4) "competitive" pricing.9 The attack based on the accusation
that the opposing economist incorrectly relied on "textbook theories of com94. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (DD.C. 2000).
The reliance on experts in the litigation was quite remarkable, with five of the government's

twelve allowed witnesses taifying as experts. For a further discussion of the role of experts
in the litigation, see Andrew I. GavilAn Analyis ofSome ProceduralAspects of the Microsoft

Trial, 13 ANTrIRUST 7, 8-9 (1999).
95.

Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37.

96.

Testimony of Frederick R. Warren-Boulton at 43, United States v. Mcrosoft Corp.,

97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233).

97.
98.

Id.
Testimony of Richard L. Schmalense at 203, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97

F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. 98-1232 & 1233) (emphasis added).

99.

Id.
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petition ' certainly
sounded like fodder for a Daubert challenge - but there
e
was none.1
Proving market power through direct evidence, however, remains particularly controversial.101 Likewise, methods for defining "anti-competitive"
market effects are not fully developed. Not surprisingly, therefore, expert
testimony that purports to establish market power through direct evidence
may trigger Daubertchallenges. The principal case study in this section, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in S Systems MaintenanceServices, Inc. v. DigitalEquipment Corp.,1 illustrates that still relatively new

scenario.1
&VtS Systems raised Daubertissues in the context of an appeal by the
plaintiffs of the district court's grant of summary judgment. In an attempt to
replicate the success of the plaintiff independent service organizations
("ISOs") in EastmanKodak Co. v. Image TechnicalServices,' 4 the plaintiffs
in SMS Systems challenged Digital Equipment Corporation's (DEC) alleged

implementation of a mandatory extended warranty program.105 The plaintiffs,

ISOs who had previously been engaged in the servicing of DEC computers
and equipment, alleged that this change in policy constituted monopolization
of a relevant market defined as the aftermarket for repair and maintenance of

DEC computers.lc
100. Several factors might explain why a Daubert challenge was not forthcoming in
Microsoft. First, the case was being tried without a jury. Therefore, the usual concerns that the
eicpert evidence might unduly influence the fact-finder may have been diminished. The district
court judge easily could have addressed any differences of opinion on the reliability of the
expert testimony in the context of his findings of fact Second, time was short The case, which
was filed in May 1998, went to trial in October 1998, and although Microsoft filed a partially
successful summary judgment motion in that time, the benefits of filing Daubertmotions may
have been perceived as minimal. Finally, it may simply be that the methodologies being used
by each side were more similar than dissimilar, and any challenge by one would have indirectly
constituted a criticism of its own approach. This may well explain why some parties still prefer
the route of summary judgment in antitrust cases to the Daubertchallenge.
101. See Toys "R"Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928,937 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting notion that
circumstantial evidence in form of seemingly diminutive market share can be used to rebut
direct evidence of exercise of market share); see also Gavil, supranote 16, at 107-09 (discussing then-pending appeal in Toys '2?" Us).
102. 188 F.3d 11 (lstCir. 1999).
103. SMS Systems Maintenance Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11 (lst Cir.
1999). See also Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F-3d 1039,1046,1056 (8th Cir.
2000) (excluding economist's testimony as to monopoly power).
104. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (affirming
court of appeals's reversal of summary judgment for defendants).
105. SMS Systems, 188 F3d at 13.
106. See id.at 13 (discussing allegations of monopolization ofaftermarket).
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An accepted element of a claim of monopolization under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act is "monopoly power,'0 °7 and SMS sought to establish DEC's
monopoly power through both direct and circumstantial evidence. Although
discussed in the context of the court's consideration of SMS's appeal of the
district court's grant of summary judgment to DEC, the testimony of the
plaintiffs's expert was analyzed as a Daubertproblem, with added guidance
from Kumho Tire.
Framing the expert's burden, the court first distinguished SMS's showing
from that made by the plaintiffs in Image Technical:
Because this case arises on an appeal from the entry of summary
judgment, it behooves us to stress further SMS's failures at the empirical
level.
Here, unlike in Kodak, the record is devoid of any evidence of supracompetitive prices or other oppressiveterms ofbusinessinthe afermarket
Here, unlike in Kodak, the record furnishes no reason to believe that new
customers are irrelevantto DEC; to the contrarythe record shows unequivocally that DEC intended to sell [its] computers vigorously to new as well
as old customers in an effort to grow its market share. Here, unlike in
Kodak, thereis also no proofindicatingthatDEC has attemptedto discriminatebetween customers who are knowledgeable and those who are not, or
that it discriminates in price (or in offering different warranty terms)
between new and repeat purchasers.... Moreover, data such as these that new customers remain important to DEC and that the warranties
offered to new and installedbase customers have exactlythe same terms are further signs of the absence of aftermarket exploitation.ls"
SMS turned in part to its expert to overcome the evidentiary shortcomings ofits case. Their expert testified that DEC had "a much greater share of
the services aftermarket than it should enjoy, given low customer satisfaction." Characterizing the import of his testimony, the court observed: "IfDEC
did not have monopoly power, this argument runs, it would not have been able
to keep its large share of the aftermarket in spite of rampant dissatisfaction." 1°'
The court took issue, however, with the expert's data collection, especially as
it related to his critical conclusion that DEC customer satisfaction was low.
Observing that he "did not conduct a customer satisfaction survey," but rather
relied on "his interpretation of certain internal DEC documents," the court
took aim at the reliability of the expert's testimony. 10
107.

See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (holding that "pos-

session of monopoly power" is an essential element of monopolization).
108.
109.
110.

SM Systems, 188 F.3d at 24 (citations omitted).
Id. at25.
Id.
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After asserting that "[e]xpert opinions... are no better than the data and
methodology that undergird them," the court labeled the expert's conclusions
as "highly suspect" because they depended upon sources cited in his report
which he "neither attached nor discussed.""' Relying in part onKumho Tire's
assertion that the courts must "make certain that an expert... employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice
of an expert in the relevant field, 11 2 the court maintained that "an expert must
vouchsafe the reliability of the data on which he relies and explain how the
cumulation of that data was consistent with standards of the expert's profession.""' It then concluded:
Not only did [the expert] fail to discuss in his report the nature of the
data and its meaning, but he failed to explain... whether the data was
sufficiently representative to permit himto draw any relevant conclusions,
and whether the sampling methodology used to compile these documents
corresponded to methods that might be considered legitimate in his discipline. Expert testimony that4 offers only a bare conclusion is insufficient
to prove the expert's point"
Viewed as atrue Daubertopinion, &MSSystems offers some insights into
the emerging "criteria of reliability" for expert economic testimony. First, the
First Circuit emphasized Kumho Tire's assertion that the expert must employ
in the courtroom '"he same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert inthe relevant field.""' This can be construed as a thinly
veiled, but persistent, criticism of the "hired gun" expert - the repeat witness
that can be fairly accused of molding his testimony to meet the needs of each
case. A critical yardstick of reliability, therefore, will be comparison of the
expert's in-court methodology with that typically practiced out of court.
More particularly, however, the court appeared to suggest that the expert
must have some methodology for insuring that data collected from internal
corporate documents is "sufficiently representative" to justify drawing any
conclusions therefrom. Moreover, the court suggested that the "sampling
methodology" must correspond to "methods that might be considered legitimate" in the relevant discipline. Although the latter point sounds in "general
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.(quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,152 (1999)).
Id.,
Id.(citation omitted).
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see also Bourelle v. Crown Equip. Corp., 220 F.3d 532,

536 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that expert's testimony must reflect "same level of intellectual rigor"

as practice in relevant field); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir.
2000) (same); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1353 (ND. Ga.

2000) (same).
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acceptance," an existing Daubert factor," 6 the former suggests a possibly
distinct and useful "criteria of reliability" that is perhaps uniquely appropriate
to economic testimony based on corporate documents. It remains to be seen,
however, whether there exists any true methodology to insure that the documents turned over to an expert in the course of preparing her testimony are
"sufficiently representative." Typically, decisions regarding which documents
are turned over to an expert are not made by the expert, but by counsel, with
due consideration being given to factors like protective orders and attorney
client privilege, as well as litigation strategy. Although the expert can request
categories of material that she needs, she generally will not be given the kind
of unhindered access to the client's files that might be required to guarantee
that the documents relied upon constitute an adequate sampling. Consequently, after SMS Systems, testifying experts would be ill-advised to rely
solely on documents pre-selected for them by counsel.
On a broader plane, SMS Systems's reasoning on admissibility and its
reliance on the Daubertline of cases are not neatly integrated into its consideration of summaryjudgment and "sufficiency." Therefore, no clear dividing
line is apparent between admissibility and sufficiency. The court simply does
not say that it concluded the expert's testimony was so unreliable as to be
deemed "inadmissible," and therefore disqualified from consideration in
opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment.' The court might
simply have been relying in part on Daubertto reach the conclusion that the
expert's report, although admissible, was insufficient to support a reasonable
jury's verdict. This lack of clarity is typical ofmany recent Daubertopinions
in the antitrust area and diminishes the utility of discussions such as that set
out in WMS Systems." 8
B. Blomkest and Conspiracy
A great deal of academic and judicial energy has been channeled over the
years into defining the scope of the "concerted action" requirement of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. By its terms, Section 1 only prohibits unreasonable
restraints of trade perpetrated via a "contract, combination inthe form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy."' 9 The Court has consistently emphasized that
116. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). "General acceptance" in the relevant field is a carry over from the pre-DaubertlFryerule. Id. at 585-86.
117. It is well-settled that evidence offered by a non-movant who will bear the burden of
proof at trial must be admissible evidence, although it need not be offered at the time of summary
judgment in aform admissible at trial. E.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,324 (1986).
118.

See infra notes 172-202 and accompanying text (discussing ConcordBoat).

119.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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this concerted action requirement distinguishes Section 1 from Section 2 and
mandates proof of some concert of action. 2 °
Frequently, as in some ofthe early cases, the defendants' agreement was
express or otherwise conceded, leaving little for the courts to do in defining
the standards for proving conspiracy.' 2 ' But as conspiracies became more
illicit, standards were needed to guide courts and juries in inferring conspiracy
from circumstantial evidence. The basic standard of proof, therefore, took
shape. To establish a conspiracy, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that
'"te conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement."'" The Court later
reformulated its test to require "direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove" that the conspirators "had a conscious commitment to a
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawfid objective."'"m
In defining the requirements of proof of conspiracy, however, the Court
uncovered an unstable fault line that divided unilateral and concerted conduct
in oligopolistic markets. Although economists as a general matter suggest that
there is a direct relationship between market concentration and collusion as
a matter of probability,2 the behavior of oligopolists will predictably mimic
the behavior of firms acting in concert - even in the absence of true agreement. Knowing how each firm in the market will react to changes in price by
the other, the oligopolists will independently elect not to engage in aggressive
competitive behavior. Instead, they will choose to maximize their profitability
by "consciously" choosing to engage in "parallel" pricing and other
behavior."m As a consequence, oligopolistic industries may tend to behave
120. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,767 n.13 (1984)
("[P]urely unilateral conduct is illegal only under § 2 and not under § 1. Monopolization without conspiracy is unlawful under § 2, but restraint oftrade without a conspiracy or combination
is not unlawful under § 1."); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,761 (1984)

(stating that Sherman Act draws "basic distinction between concerted and independent action"
and that "[i]ndependent action is not proscribed" under Section 1).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392,394 (1927) (stating that
fact of combination was not contested); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211,213-18 (1899) (noting that defendants admitted association in answer).
122. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946), cited with
approvalin Copperweld,467 U.S. at 771.
123. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768.
124. See e.g.,DENSW.CARLTON&JEEREYMPERLOF, MOD.RNINDUSTRIALORCANIZATION 134 (3d ed. 2000) ("Empirical evidence supports the view that cartels are more likely
in concentrated industries.").
125. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
227 (1993) (explaining that conscious parallelism is conduct "not in itself unlawful, by which
firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a
profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests").
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anti-competitively, but not pursuant to any agreement, explicit or illicit. The
question then is whether Section l's requirement of agreement should be read
strictly, in which case oligopolistic pricing would fall outside of the reach of
the Sherman Act, or broadly, so that it could be condemned as price-fixing.
The Court came down on the side ofmaintaining the integrity ofthe legal
requirement of conspiracy in TheatreEnterprisesv. ParamountFilm Distributing Corp.,26 where it held that proof of parallel pricing by oligopolists alone
would not establish conspiracy for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act:
"Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made

heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but

'conscious parallelism' has not read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.""I2 As a consequence, proving conspiracy in an oligopolistic industry

requires something more than mere parallel pricing. That "something more"
has been referred to as "plus factors," defined by one commentator as '"he
additional facts or factors required to be proved as a prerequisite to finding

that parallel action amounts to a conspiracy."" In a sense, therefore, the law
of antitrust conspiracy is an example oflaw constraining economics. Whereas
there are economic reasons for treating conscious parallelism and conspiracy
alike, there are legal reasons for not doing so."
Three developments have impelled these well-settled principles of anti-

trust conspiracy to collide with Daubert. First, in its pre-Daubert1986 deci126. 346 U.S. 537 (1954); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ATITrRUST LAW
DEVELOPmENTS 9-10 & n.47 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing effect of conscious parallelism in

various cases).
127. Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954). In a
well known and still influential confrontation in the early 1960s, two noted antitrust academics
squared off on whether antitrust law should strictly adhere to the concerted action requirement
in such instances or, in recognition of their like economic consequences, deem parallel pricing
by oligopolists to be the legal equivalent of "agreement" Compare Donald F. Turner, The
Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: ConsciousParallelismandRefilsals to Deal,
75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962) (arguing that conscious parallelism should not be deemed
equivalent of agreement) with Richard A. Posner, Oligopol and the Antitrust Laws: A SuggestedApproach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969) (noting that parallel pricing by oligopolists is
so likely to be consequence of agreement, not interdependence, that it should be condemned).
128. VI PHILJPARmDA, ANITRUST LAW 1433e (1986); see also William E. Kovacic,
The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANT1TRUST BUIL. 5, 31-55 (1993) (synthesizing operative list of plus factors from relevant case law).
For a recent application of the parallel pricing - plus factor framework, see In re Baby Food
Antitrust Litig., 166 F3d 112,121-23 (3d Cir. 1999).
129. One obstacle noted by commentators is remedy - because firms engaged in consciously parallel behavior are motivated by self interest, how would an injunction be drafted to
order them to alter their behavior as to not maximize their profits? See Turner,supra note 127,
at 669 (discussing possible form injunction might take).
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sion inMatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,13 a case that
largely tumed on the courts's treatment of expert economic testimony,"' the
Supreme Court significantly raised the bar for plaintiffs seeking to prove
conspiracy, albeit inthe guise of summaryjudgment. 2 Second, owing in part
to Matsushitaand in part to increased scholarship in the area,' 33 litigants are
developing a heightened awareness of the role economists can play in estab-

lishing, or defeating, a showing of conspiracy.TM Finally, and most recently,
130. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
131. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(raising bar for conspiracy claim). Although the Supreme Court addressed the expert's testimony with respect to conspiracy in Matsushita as a sufficiency question under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Summary Judgment), the lower courts had addressed it as an
admissibility question under Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Gavil,
supra note 15, at 688-92 (discussingMatsushitaand its prior history).
132. Matsushita,475 U.S. at 587. The Court rejected as "implausible" evidence that the
defendants, 21 Japanese television manufacturers, had engaged in a 20-year conspiracy to price
television sets at predatory levels in order to eliminate U.S. rivals. The Court reasoned that "if
the factual context renders [plaintiffs's] claim implausible - if the claim is one that simply makes
no economic sense - [plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support
their claim than would otherwise be necessary." Id. at 587. The Court continued:
[A]ntitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence
in a § I case. Thus,.. . [to survive a motion for summary judgment or for a
directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § I must present
evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted
independently.... [They] must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable
in light of the competing inferences ofindependent action ....
Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 456 U.S. 752,764 (1984)). Some
lower courts have read Matsushita as raising the bar of proof on all horizontal conspiracy
claims, whereas others have confined it to situations where the conspiracy alleged is particularly
implausible. Compare Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028,1032 (8th Cir.
2000) ("We are among the majority of circuits to apply Monsanto and Matsushitabroadly, and
in both horizontal and vertical cases.") with In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 186 F.3d 781,787 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that plaintiffi alleging conspiracy "did not...
as the defendant manufacturers rather absurdly argue, have to exclude all possibility that the
manufacturers" acted collusively), cert denied, 120 S.Ct 1220 (2000).
133. See generally, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fiingin the
ElectronicMarketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996); Jonathan B. Baker, Two ShermanAct
Section 1 Dilemmas: ParallelPricing,the Oligopoly Problem, and ContemporaryEconomic
Theory, 38 ANrrRUSTBLu 143 (1993); GcorgeA. Hay, The Meaningof"Agreement" Under
the Sherman Act: Thoughtsfrom the "Facilitating
Practices"Experience, 16 REV. IND. ORG.
113 (2000); Dennis Yao & Susan DeSanti, Game Theory and the LegalAnalysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST BuIL. 113 (1993).
134. Noting that "the definition ofwhat qualifies as an 'agreement' is ultimately a question
of law and driven by policy considerations," Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested that, "nevertheless, an economist can contribute many observations relevant to the fact finder's determination."
Herbert Hovenkamp, Economic Expertsin Antitrust Cases,in 3 FAIGmAN ET AL, supranote 82,
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there has been a decided increase in the number ofmajor, industry-wide cartel
cases being prosecuted by the government' 35 and by private parties."3 6 These
three developments together provoked several in depth appellate court considerations of the role of economists in proving conspiracy. But the courts have
not uniformly done so through use of the "Dauberthearing.""13
Mostrecently,BlomkestFertilizer,Inc. v. PotashCorp.I's presented something of a classic confrontation over the meaning of "agreement" for purposes
of Section I ofthe Sherman Act. A class action brought by direct purchasers
and resolved on summary judgment, the action faltered on a divided en bane
§ 38-3.3, at 193. According to Hovenkamp:

These observations include (1) whether the market structure would make an agreement rational or worthwhile; (2) whether the market structure makes an agreement
unnecessary, (3) whether firms's actions are contrary to self-interest except on the
supposition of an agreement; (4) whether the degree of parallelism is sufficient that,
when coupled with other factors, a fact inference of agreement is warranted.
Id. Hovenkamp observed, however, "that much of what the economists have to say on the
matter is theoretical and not subject to empirical falsification at all." Id. See also City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F3d 548, 565 (1lth Cir. 1998) (excluding statistician's
testimony as to ultimate fact of conspiracy as beyond his expertise and as impermissible
invasion of province ofjury); H AREEDA ET AL., supra note 56, at 117-18 (discussing City of
Tuscaloosa's use ofDaubertto challenge evidence of conspiracy).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645,650-56 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing
criminal price fixing prosecutions in the lysine industry); United States v. Ikeda, No. 00-0393,
6 TRADE REG. REP. (CCB) 45,000 (Case No. 4549) (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing criminal
price fixing in sorbate food preservative industry); United States v. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd.,
No. 399-CR-333, 6 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,099, Nos. 4467-69 (ND. Tex. 1999)
(discussing 13 criminal price fixing indictments in vitamins industry and collective $850 million
in fines collected through plea agreements).
136. See generally, e.g., Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp.,203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir.
2000); In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 1531
(2000); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1220 (2000); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir.
1999); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998), cert denied,
120 S. Ct. 309 (1999).
137. For the most extensive treatment of Daubert and conspiracy, see City of Tuscaloosa,
158 F.3d at 562-67. See alsoBlomkest, 203 F.3d at 1037-38 (determining that expert testimony
was unreliable without reference to Dauber); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 186 F3d at 786-88 (excluding expert testimony on conspiracy on basis that it was irrelevant, without reliance on Daubert test); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1348, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (evaluating expert testimony on conspiracy under
Daubert). For additional antitrust conspiracy cases prior to Kumho Tire, see Petruzi's IGA
Supermarkets, Inc. v. DarlingDelawareCo., 998 F.2d 1224,1237-41 (3d Cir. 1993), and Ohio
v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (determining admissibility of
expert testimony on conspiracy using Dauberttest).
138. 208 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000).
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court's view of the insufficiency of the plaintiff's proof of conspiracy in an
oligopolistic industry.139 The division in the court tumed in part on conflicting
views ofthe reliability of an expert economist's testimony on conspiracy - but
with no apparent reference to Daubert.'4
Blomkest involved a class action alleging price fixing in the potash
industry. The plaintiffs's core story was that potash prices during the relevant
period rose higher and fell less than they should have due to collusion among
the producers, who were dominated by several Canadian finns. The defendants responded that any increase in prices, or their failure to drop more precipitously, was largely the consequence of two intervening events. First, in
response to anti-dumping proceedings inthe United States, the Canadian firms
entered into a Suspension Agreement, which raised potash prices. Second, in
response to "over-production" and consequent unprofitability (which may
have led to the alleged dumping), a Canadian government owned producer
was privatized, which in turn led to decreased output and higher prices.14'
The class plaintiffs alleged that "the producers's [sic] prices were roughly
equivalent during the alleged conspiracy, despite differing production costs....
1 42
[and] that price changes by one producer were quickly met by the others."'
Reading these allegations together with the undisputed fact that the industry
was an "oligopoly, 143 the court initially concluded that "[t]he class's pricefixing claim is based on a theory of conscious parallelism.""' To overcome
the insurmountable legal hurdle of relying solely on the parallel pricing ofthe
defendants, however, the class offered three "plus factors" to support its claim
of conspiracy- "(1) interflnn communications between the producers; (2) the
producers's [sic] acts against self-interest; and (3) econometric models which
purport to prove that the price of potash would have been substantially lower
in the absence of collusion."' 45 Of course, expert economic testimony was the
proof offered for the third plus factor.
A one vote majority of the en banc court concluded that the expert's
report was "not probative of collusion."'" The court's analysis revealed that
at least one of its principal concerns was the reliability of the economist's
139.
140.

Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 208 F.3d 1028,1032-37 (8th Ck. 2000).
Id. at 1037-38.

141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1032.
See id. at 1031 ("Both parties agree that the North American potash industry is an

oligopoly.").
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1038.

57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 831 (2000)
methodology - which would appear to be an undiagnosed Daubertissue. In
the court's view, the "class's expert evidence is lacking in two crucial respects."'147 First, the court agreed with the defendants that the economist's
model failed to consider two critical and undisputed events that could have
explained the pricing behavior: the suspension agreement and the privatization ofthe principal Canadian firm.148 In other words, the expert failed to take
into account two essential independent variables in assessing the likelihood
that collusion, and not some lawful conduct, explained the firms' pricing
patterns. 149 The court concluded: "A model that does no more than report that
prices did, indeed, rise after these events tells us nothing about the existence
150
of industry collusion.
The second flaw identified by the court related to the expert's "almost
exclusiv[e]" reliance on evidence that "is not probative of collusion as a
matter of law." 151 As examples, the court mentioned the expert's apparent
reliance on '"he producer's common membership in trade associations and
their publications of price lists to customers."'52 Trade association membership suggests opportunity to collude, whereas the publication of price lists
could be a facilitating device.
According to the court; under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, these facts,
which underlay the expert's ultimate conclusion that the defendants conspired,
themselves need not be admissible if they are "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in a particular field." 5 3 But in the court's view, experts in
the field did not typically rely on similar facts to evaluate conspiracy. Rule
703, according to the court, contemplates that there will be "sufficient facts
already in evidence or disclosed bythe witness as a result of his or her investigation to take such expert opinion testimony out of the realm of guesswork
and speculation."' 54 The presence of the defendants at common meetings and
their circulation of price lists were not factors typically relied upon by economists to support an expert opinion as to the existence of a conspiracy. To
conclude otherwise was mere speculation.

147.
148.
149.
ings. Id.
150.

Id.
Id.
The dissent sharply disagreed, particularly with respect to the anti-dumping proceedat 1041 n.12 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1038.

151.
152.

Id.
Id.

153.

Id. (quoting FED. 1L EVID. 703).

154.

Id.(quoting Hurst v. United States, 882 F.2d 306,311 (8th Cir. 1989)).
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Thus, the court rejected the expert's report as "unreliable" on two
grounds: "In this case, the expert's model is fundamentally unreliable because
of his heavy (ifnot exclusive) reliance on evidence that is not probative of
conspiracy, coupled with his failure to consider significant external forces that
served to raise the price of potash."' 5 Absent the expert evidence and given
the court's rejection of the plaintiffl' other two plus factors as probative of
conspiracy, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants.' 56
Blomkest reflects something of a lost opportunity to clarifythe operation
of Daubertand Kumho Tire to a recurring antitrust issue - proof of conspiracy. First; the court failed to acknowledge that the first flaw in the expert's
report was a methodological one, properly analyzed as an admissibility issue
under Daubert. Any reference to its lack of "probative" value, therefore,
should have been tied directlyto Daubert's"relevant and reliable" framework
The Blomkest court should have stated that it was excluding the report because the report depended upon unreliable methodology, which in turn rendered it irrelevant. The result would have been a more precise articulation of
the court's path to its ultimate finding of evidentiary insufficiency.
Moreover, by utilizing a non-Daubertapproach to analyzing the first flaw
in the economist's report, the court lost an opportunity to explore the operation of Kumho Tire. "Failure to include a significant independent variable"
very arguably constitutes a criteriaof reliabilityfor any sort of regression or
other method of multi-factor analysis. Had the court articulated it as such, it
could have provided some needed guidance regarding the operation of Kumho
Tire in the antitrust context.
Similarly, the second flaw identified by the court could have been
used as a vehicle for clarifying the operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in evaluating expert economic testimony. The implicit framework
for the court's discussion ofthe two defects in the expert's report is its distinction of Rule 702 methodological issues, which are to be addressed under
Daubert, from Rule 703 application issues, which arguably fall outside of
Daubert.57 By disconnecting the first issue from Rule 702 and Daubertand
by simply describing the two grounds independently without offering any
guidance as to how they interrelate, the court passed up an opportumity to
establish clear standards for the lower courts and other circuits.

155.

Id. (citing Loudermill v.Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1988)).

156.

Id.

157. For a discussion of this possible Rule 702/703 framework, see Gavil, supra note 15,
at 682-85. By expressly including application of methodology within its terms, however, the
revised Rule 702 at least diminishes the possible independent role of Rule 703.
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Finally, the court never even used the word "admissibility" in connection
with its consideration ofthe first defect. In contrast, through reliance on Rule
703, the court explicitly tied concerns about the expert's reliance on trade
association membership and the use of price lists - the second flaw - to "admissibility." Furthermore, the court concluded its discussion of both defects
in the economist's report by invoking "reliability." However, by neither establishing that the two grounds for exclusion of the expert's report shared a
common basis in admissibility, nor contrasting the arguably distinct reliability
concerns of Rules 702 and 703, the court muddied the Daubert waters and
exacerbated ongoing confusion about the relationship of admissibility and
sufficiency decisions.
The Eighth Circuit's treatment of the expert testimony of conspiracy in
Blomkest, however, is in many ways typical of how other courts recently have
treated similar testimony. In In re Baby FoodAntitrustLitigation, for example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed in detail the statistical and
other testimony offered by the plaintiff to support its allegation of parallel
pricing before affirming the district court's conclusion that the testimony was
insufficient to survive summary judgment on the fact of conspiracy."" However, the objections to the expert's testimony found by both the district court
and the court of appeals were focused almost exclusively on his methodology. 159 Nevertheless, there is no discussion of Daubert and no effort to
develop a replicable set of "criteria of reliability" from the various defects
found in the expert's methods. Instead, there is extensive, fact-specific criticism of the expert's methodology, invoked as a basis for the court's conclusion of evidentiary insufficiency." °
158. See In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 138 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that
plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient circumstantial evidence of collusion to exclude possibility
of independent action); see also In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant). The Citric Acid court rejected the plaintiff's
reliance on an economic expert report, which it offered in part to establish that the alleged
conspirator's market share remained constant over a two year period. In the plaintiff's view,
the constant market share constituted circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy that fixed market
share targets for each of the co-conspirators. The court rejected the effort, however, on the
ground that the report's conclusion that there were, in fact, constant market shares depended
upon a document otherwise not in evidence. Id. at 1102 ("[A]ny inference founded upon [a
factual assertion unsupported by record evidence] - even one drawn by an economic expert is necessarily unreasonable."). Expressed in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the
court's conclusion appeared to be intertwined with an apparent sufficiency judgment. Id.
("When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the
law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable,
it cannot support a jury's verdict." (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wflliamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 227,242 (1993))).
159. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d at 128-30.
160. Id. at 128-32; see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d
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61 remains the
To date, City of Tuscaloosav. HarcrosChemicals, Inc."
principal federal appellate decision that extensively addressed Daubert's
application to antitrust, and it too involved the use of expert evidence to support allegations of conspiracy. 62 Moreover, it emphasized the distinction that
should be drawn between admissibility decisions made under Daubert and
sufficiency decisions made in connection with summary judgment motions
under Rule 56.163 Despite its status as the first federal appellate court to apply
Daubertto antitrust, however, its example has not been widely followed."6

C. ConstructingDamageModels
Economists also have made increasingly frequent appearances in antitrust
cases as principal witnesses on damages. Although traditional case law
established the general principle that, once liability is found, the standards of
proof on damages should not be rigorous," plaintiffi have faced increasingly
781, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting district courts' exclusion of expert economist's testimony
under Daubert, but concluding that it was nevertheless "objectionable" as irrelevant). Further
blurring the line between admissibility and sufficiency, the court later went on to suggest that
a part of the economist's testimony was "properly excluded or alternatively entitled to no
weight." Id. at 788.

161. 158 F.3d 548 (l lth Cir. 1998), cert denied, 120 S. Ct 309 (1999).
162. See City ofTuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548,562-67 (11thCir. 1998)
(examining admissibility of plaintiff's proffered expert testimony as it supported allegations of
conspiracy), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 309 (1999). Although the decision pre-dated Kumho Tire,
it correctly anticipated Knho Tire's endorsement of the "flexible" approach to identifying and
applying criteria ofreliability fit for the particular subject of expertise. Id.at 566 n.25.
163. Id. at 564-65. Maintaining that distinction was critical in both the district court and
the court of appeals because Joiner and Kumho Tire clearly held that the standard on review of
both admissibility decisions generally, and of "criteria of reliability" decisions particularly,
should be reversed only for abuse of discretion. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,13839 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,152-53 (1999). In contrast, evidentiary sufficiency questions are reviewed do novo. 11 MOOE' s FEDMALPRACrICE §56A1[3]a]
(3d ed. 1990). For a more in depth discussion of the ramifications of maintaining these distinct
standards of appellate review inDaubert decisions, see Gavil, supra note 15, at 703-07.
164. But see In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1361 (N.D.
Ga. 2000) (denying in large part defendants' Daubert motions to exclude testimony of statistician and economist regarding alleged antitrust conspiracy and damages).
165. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)
(noting that damage issues relating to partial or total market exclusion are rarely susceptible to
concrete, detailed proof of injury); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251,265 (1946)
(stating that wrongdoer shall bear risk of uncertainty caused by his own wrongdoing in proof
of damage in antitrust suits); see also New York v. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202 F.3d 82,
88 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Zenith in support of its decision reversing district court's exclusion
of plaintiff's proposed expert testimony on antitrust damages on ground that diminished
substantive legal standard of Zenith should be taken into account in assessing motions to
exclude damages testimony under Daubero .
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skeptical courts in presenting their cases for damages and have called upon
economists to improve the odds of recovery.
Again, the traditional legal framework is important to consider. In the
past, courts generally accepted two principal kinds of models of antitrust
damages: "before and after" and "yardstick."'1 66 "Before and after" models
could be used in price fixing and other kinds of consumer damage cases and by
injured, although not destroyed, prey in cases ofexclusionary conduct. In price
fixing cases, "before and after models" tried to compare prices in the nonconspiracy period to prices in the conspiracy period and use the difference as
a baseline approximation of damages.167 In cases of exclusionary conduct, in
which the prey continued in business, the method could be used to focus on the
prey's before and after profitability. Assuming that the diminution in profits
in the period ofunlawful conduct could be causally linked to the anti-competitive conduct, it too could produce an approximation of damages. 168
'Yardstick" models are more typical in cases of totally successful exclusionary conduct. These models seek to place a value on a firm that has exited
the market. The "yardstick" method does so by comparing the excluded firm
to a similar one - a yardstick - that has remained in the market and has not
been the victim of predation. 69 The method can be used to establish a "going
concern"
value for the business or a profit projection for fiture, unrealized
70
years.'
While these basic models in large part continue to influence damages evidence in antitrust cases,171 newer, more sophisticated, and more case specific
econometric models are also being employed. A case2 in point is the recent
decision in ConcordBoat Corp.v. Brunswick Corp.1
166. Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative"AntitrustDamages, 70 WASI. L.
REV. 423,443 (1995); see alsoIIAREEDAETAL., supranote 56, 391d (comparing two traditional models of antitrust damages).
167. IIAREEDA ET AL., supranote 56, at 484-85.

168.

Blair &Page, supra note 166, at 443-50.

169. Id. at451-54.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American SimmentalAss'n, 178 F.3d 1035,
1039-41 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting as unreliable under Daubertand Kumho Tire expert's use
of before and after model to establish damages due to model's failure to include all significant
independent variables); Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 175 F.3d 18,
26-31 (1st Cir.) (discussing before and after lost profits and going concern value as measures
of damages for antitrust violations), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 331 (1999); In re VISA Check/
Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 74-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding "but for"

damages projections admissible for purposes of class certification inquiry in tying case).
172. 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000); see also CoastalFuels, 175 F.3d at 28 (concluding
that going concern value should be evaluated as of time plaintiff goes out of business and lost

profits awarded only up to that date).
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ConcordBoat involves the appeal of a jury verdict and denial of posttrial motions in an action brought against the allegedly dominant manufacturer
of stem drive marine engines by a group of boat builders." 3 The builders
alleged that Brunswick had violated Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act" 4 by acquiring two of its principal competitors; they also alleged that it violated Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 75 through a variety of discount and other incentive programs it offered to its customers. 176 An expert economist was retained
to address two sets of issues: liability and damages."7
Brunswick responded with a pre-trial Daubertmotionto exclude portions
ofthe economist's testimony. 17 Brunswick charged that the expert's damages
model did not sufficiently disaggregate lost sales attributable to lawful, as
opposed to allegedly unlawful, conduct.'7 9 In response to certain representations by the plaintiffs that the problem of dis-aggregation would be addressed
at trial, the district court permitted the testimony. 8 0 But it did so without
making any "specific findings regarding [the economist's] methodology or the
bases of his opinions. ' On appeal, Brunswick renewed its charge that the
economist's opinions should have been excluded under Daubert as unreliable."m
In an extensive treatment ofDaubert,as well as JoinerandKumho Tire,

the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, noting that "[clounsel's assur173. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2000)
(rjecting expert's opinion as "mere speculation" because of failure to incorporate all aspects
of economic reality of stern drive engine market and because testimony did not separate effects
of lawful conduct from unlawful conduct).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
175.
176. Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1045-46.
177. The plaintiffs in Concord Boat sought damages for the alleged "overcharges" they
paid for stem drive marine engines. This discussion concerns only the expert's proposed
testimony on damages. For other recent Daubert-based challenges to expert damages testimony
in antitrust cases, see Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.
1998) (stating that while district court concluded at summary judgment that expert's testimony
regarding alleged below cost pricing was insufficient, this was not inherently incompatible with
its earlier conclusion that expert's testimony was relevant and reliable for purposes ofDaubert);
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Grinnell Lithographic Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 126, 141-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(noting that district court preliminarily concluded that expert's damage model was relevant and
reliable for Daubert purposes in commercial bribery action brought under Section 2(c) of
Clayton Act).

178.
179.

ConcordBoat, 207 F.3d at 1046.
Id.

180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1055.

57 WASH. &LEEL. REV 831 (2000)
ances did not eliminate the need for a thorough analysis of the expert's
economic model and his proffered opinion." 83 Quoting from Daubert, the
court implied that the "thorough analysis" had a dual purpose: (1) to make a
"preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid" and (2) to determine whether the expert's
testimony "is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the
jury.' 84 The couxtthentumedto Joinerand Kumho Tire, both of which in its
-view particularly emphasized the application or "fit" step in assessing the
expert's testimony, concluding that "[e]ven a theory that might meet certain
Daubert factors, such as peer review and publication, testing, known or
potential error rate, and general acceptance, should not be admitted if it does
not apply to the specific facts of the case."' 8 5 At this point, however, the
court's opinion begins to lose a sharp focus in two ways. First, it fails to draw
any clear line between criteria of reliability and the question of application or
fit. Second, it appears to lose its initially clear focus on admissibility and
drifts into sufficiency.
In support of the plaintiffs' damages claim, their economist purported to
rely on a "Cournot model" that, according to the court, "posits that a firm
'maximizes its profits by assuming the observed output of other firms as a
given, and then equating its own marginal cost and marginal revenue on that
assumption."" 86 The court then explained the expert's proposed testimony as
follows:
[The economist] postulated that in a stem drive engine market that was
competitive, Brunswick and some other firm would each maintain a 50%
market share. Under this theory, any market share over 50% would be
evidence of anticompetitive conduct on Brunswick's part. Since Brunswick atvariouspoints intime had garnered amarket share as large as78%
percent [sic], [the economist] concludedthatithadengagedinanicompetitive conduct andthattheboatbuilders hadbeenoverchargedatthemoment
Brunswick's market share surpassed the 50% threshold.'8
One of the defendant's expert economists challenged this methodology,
asserting "that there was no rational basis by which [the plaintiffs' expert's
model] could identify alleged overcharges.' 18 More specifically, he testified
that the expert did not really use a "Cournot model;" rather, he used a simple
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 1056 (quoting Daubert v. Merreli Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-93

(1993)).
185. Id,
186.

Id. at 1046-47 (quoting IVAREEDAETAL., supranote 56, 925a).

187.
188.

Id. at 1047.
Id.
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and "mechanical" formula that simply assumed overcharges for all market
shares over 50%.189 The only independent variable considered, therefore, was
market share."9 This was amethodologicallyunsound approach, he argued, on
two grounds. First it failed to consider factors other than Brunswick's allegedly anti-competitive conduct that might have explained increases in its market
share. 91 It also failedto considerthe price at which Brunswick actually sold its
engines, which would be a critical factor in assessing any alleged overcharge. 19
The Court of Appeals agreed, declaring that the plaintiffi' economist
"used the Cournot model to construct a hypothetical market which was not
grounded in the economic reality of the stem drive engine market, for it
ignored inconvenient evidence. "" As the defendant's expert argued, the
plaintiffs' expert's model failed to take actual costs and non-anticompetitive
conduct into account, rendering his opinion unreliable and properly excluded:
"[The economist's] expert opinion should not have been admitted because it
did not incorporate all aspects of the economic reality ofthe stem drive engine
1 94
market and because it did not separate lawful from unlawful conduct.
Here again, the courttook a curious turn. Without any cleartransition, the
court's discussion moved directly from admissibility to sufficiency and from
reliability to probative value. After reaching its apparent conclusion that the
exper's testimony on damages should have been excluded, the court immediately launched into a series of statements about expert testimony and evidentiary sufficiency, each supported by non-Daubertcase law. Whenjuxtaposed
and collected together, they significantly blur the line between Daubert's
concerns about admissibility and summaryjudgment's focus on sufficiency:
Because of the deficiencies in the foundation ofthe opinion, the expert's
resulting conclusions were "mere speculation. "195

189.

Id.

190. Id.
191. See id. at 1045 (noting apparently undisputed evidence in record that Brunswick's
market share grew significantly on several occasions as direct consequence of marketing
blunders of its rivals).
192. See id. at 1047 (stating that plaintitfs' expert's model treated price at which Brunswick sold its engines as irrelevant for purposes of formula because overcharge amount was

related solely to Brunswick's market share).
193.

Id. at 1056.

194.

Id.at 1056-57.

195.

Id. at 1057 (quoting VirginAtl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d

571,580 (SD.N.Y. 1999)). Ina parenthetical, the court quoted Virgin Airways for the proposi-

tion that "summary judgment is] appropriate on Section Iand 2 [ShermanAct] claims because
'an expert's opinion is not a substitute for a plaintiff's obligation to provide evidence of facts
that support the applicability of the expert's opinion to the case.'" Id.
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Expert testimonythat is speculative is not competentproof and contributes
"nothing to a 'legally sufficient evidentiaty basis. ' "'
Expert testimony is useful as a guide to interpreting market facts, but it is
not a substitute for themY 7
[E]xpert opinion evidence ... haslittleprobativevalueincomparisonwith
the economic factors 9 8
An expert opinion cannot sustainajury'sverdict when it "isnot supported
by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable
record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable."' 99
The ConcordBoat court's journey from Daubert,Joiner,and Kumho Tire to
Matsushita and Brooke Group was completed in its conclusion to the discussion:
Here [the economist's] expert opinion was the basis of the boat builders'
damage case, and the jury clearly relied on his opinion in reaching its verdict.... It cannot be said that the verdict would have beenthe same without the expert testimony, and its admission affected Brunswick's substanBrunswick's motion for judgment should have therefore been
tial rights.
2
granted. 00

All of the cited authorities, some of which pre-date Daubert, involve
either summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, and thus do not
directly concern admissibility decisions under Daubert. Indeed, following the
progression through these statements of legal principle, it is evident that the
court conflated a package of related, albeit distinct rules with distinct purposes. The result was a blurring of the lines between two principles directly
related to Daubertand admissibility and three principles that concern sufficiency and evolved both before and after Daubert. The Daubertadmissibility
principles are:
(1) the district court as gatekeeper must conduct an independent analysis
of the relevance and reliability of the expert's methodology, that should
include a flexible assessment of appropriate criteria of reliability of
methodology, and
196. Id. (quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011, 1015-20 (2000)) (citing
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wdliamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,242 (1993)).
197. Id. at 1057 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209,242 (1993)).
198. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
n.19 (1986)).
199.

Id. (quotingBrooke Group, 509 U.S. at 242).

200.

Id. (citing Weisgram, 120 S. Ct. at 1015).
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(2) the district court should evaluate the soundness of the application of
a reliable methodology to particular facts ("fit").
The pre- and post-Daubertsufficiency principles are:
(1) reliable methodologies used to produce speculative conclusions may
not be legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict and thereby defeat a
motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law;
(2) a reliably derived expert opinion may nevertheless be deemed insufficient to defeat summary judgment when other, non-expert evidence of
record renders it an unreasonable basis for a jury verdict; and
(3) when a reviewing appellate court concludes that evidence was improperly admitted at trial in the district court, it can proceed to enter
judgment as a matter of law if the remaining evidence is insufficient to
support a reasonable jury's verdict. 01
By failing to distinguish among these two groups of principles - one
relating to admissibility, the other to sufficiency - the bases for the court's
decision in Concord Boat to exclude the plaintiffl' expert's testimony on
damages and enter judgment as a matter of law to the defendant are uncertain,
at best. As to admissibility, the court failed to fix the reason for exclusion.
Was it the unreliability of the expert's Cournot model? The court appeared
to suggest that the model itself was not under review; only its application to
the facts was challenged. 2' The basis for the exclusion, therefore, appears to
lie in some infirmity associated with the expert's application of the model to
the facts. Yet the court's specific criticisms of the expert's testimony - that
it failed to consider real world pricing and that it did not distinguish between
the market share effects of lawful and unlawful conduct - related to the
expert's failure to incorporate certain independent variables into the model.
201.

The Supreme Court recently settled this issue in Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct

1011 (2000).
202. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039,1055-56 (8th Cir. 2000)
("The district court commented that because Brunswick had not challenged the Coumot model
as a scientific theory, its 'criticisms are reduced to complaints about how [the expert] applied
the Cournot model to the facts of this case.'") (quoting Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,
21 F. Supp. 2d 923, 934 (E.D. Ark. 1998))), It remains unclear whether the defendant ever
questioned the propriety of using the Coumot model to establish damages. This is surprising,
given that the model was not developed as a method for demonstrating damages from anticompetitive conduct Instead, it merely describes likely behavior by non-cooperating duopolists
and oligopolists. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 122, at 157-65 (discussing uses of
Cournot Model). Therefore, although the absence of Coumot-predicted behavior may suggest
coordination among oligopolists, its use as a methodology for establishing damages may be
doubtful

See also IV ARPEDA ET Al., supra note 56,

source of insight into importance of market structure).

925 (discussing Cournot model as
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That sounds more like a challenge to the model as constructed than to its
application. It could also reveal that the expert's attempt to legitimize a questionable methodology simply by labeling it a "Cournot model" was exposed
and deemed unreliable.
In either event, the court's segue from a focus on admissibility to commentary on sufficiency raises a broader question: Did the court simply conclude that the model with its various flaws was "insufficient," such that a
reasonable jury could not have returned a verdict based onthe expert's damage
numbers? Certainly its abrupt shift from cases in the Daubert line to those
addressing summaryjudgment and judgment as a matter of law supports such
a reading of the discussion as a whole. And the court failed to ask whether
any non-expert evidence was admitted that could arguably have sustained a
verdict. In the end, although it seems certain that the court intended to hold
that the plaintiffs' expert's testimony on damages should have been excluded,
its discussion failed to bring that point to closure and left open the possibility
that its decision was based on a sufficiency judgment.
The better and more defensible approach would have been to conclude
that the expert's report was inadmissible and then ask if there was any nonexpert testimony on the question of damages. In the absence of other evidence, the exclusion of the expert report should lead to summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law - not owing to its "insufficiency," but to the
absence of any admissible evidence of damages. Judgment was warranted
because there was no admissible evidence to support a reasonable jury verdict
on damages. Any discussion of expert sufficiency thereafter is no better than
dicta. By failing to articulate each of these steps carefully, ConcordBoat,like
Blomkest, missed the opportunity to provide some much needed guidance to
the lower courts and other circuits on how Daubertand cases like Matsushita
and Brooke Group should be properly integrated in the antitrust context.
D. Emerging Criteriaof Reliability
What can preliminarily be gleaned from these cases? Most apparent is
the lack of consistency in how Daubert challenges are being treated, especially when they arise contemporaneously with motions for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. Although some relatively focused treatments of Daubertmotions have been reported, 2 3 the courts of appeals are the
prime offenders in merging the admissibility and sufficiency issues that
frequently arise when the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case is dependent upon
203. See generally,e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348
(ND. Ga. 2000); Virginia Vermiculate, Ltd. v. W.R Grace & Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D.

Va. 2000).
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the admissibility of the expert's testimony.2' Ifthe courts' lack of clear focus
on admissibility is overlooked, however, certain trends in terms of "criteria of
reliability" may be developing.
First, as noted in SMS Systems, courts are increasingly demonstrating
hostility towards the professional expert witness and are demanding a showing
that the methodologies utilized in the courtroom do not vary from those used
in the expert's field.20 5 But this seemingly laudable goal may simply be
impractical. It makes no accommodation, for example, for the forensic
context. Data collection in the context of civil discovery may be limited and
invariably will be affected by protective orders and the need to maintain
attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. It may be, therefore,
that the aspiration of duplicating the standards of purely academic economics
in the courtroom is unrealistic. The question remains whether we should

"make do" with what is attainable, in essence judging the reliability of forensic economics on its own terms.
But two other, more concrete "criteria of reliability" also seem to be

emerging. With respect to regression analysis, the inclusion of all significant
independent variables appear to be significant "criteria of reliability," as was
apparent in Blomkest and ConcordBoat.206 Similarly, as in SS Systems,
courts are evaluating whether the data relied uponto formulate expert opinions
204.

The clear exception here is the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in City

of Tuscaloosav. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 565 ( lth Cir. 1998) (finding lower court

erred in confusing and conflating admissibility issues with issues regarding sufficiency of
evidence to survive summary judgment), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 309 (1999), and cert denied,
120 S.Ct. 47 (1999).
205. See SMS Sys. Maintenance Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F3d 11, 25 (1st
Cir. 1999) (asserting that expert witnesses must vouch for reliability of data on which they rely
and explain how accumulation of data is consistent with standards of expert's profession), cert
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1241 (2000); see also Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the
Economic Witness, 13 J.ECON. PERsPS., Spring 1999, at 93 (noting criticism that paid witnesses
are bound to be partisans rather than disinterested, truthfil witnesses). Although Judge Posner

generally rejected fears that economists will forfeit their objectivity in their role as expert
witnesses, id. at 93-95, he also cautioned that "[w]here the use of economic experts is most
problematic is in the areas of economics in which there is no professional consensus," citing
antitrust economics as an example. Id. at 96.
206. See supra Part IV.B (discussing deficiency in expert testimony that failed to take into
account essential independent variables in Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 208 F.3d

1028,1032-37 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also ConcordBoat, 207 F.3d at 1056-57 (stating thnt expert
opinion failed to include inconvenient factors and therefore cannot sustain jury's verdict); Blue
Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035,1039-41 (8th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting expert's model as unreliable because it failed to consider critical independent
variables); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1364-66 (rejecting
defendant's assertion that plaintiff's expert's regression analysis of alleged damages from price
fixing conspiracy failed to include all significant independent variables).
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is sufficiently complete and representative. While these factors may seem
intuitively obvious, it is as yet unclear whether they will be applied consistently and rigorously in testing the reliability of expert economic testimony.
Finally, there is the role of"fit" that was emphasized in ConcordBoat."°
There, however, the court viewed Daubert'snotion of "fit" as relating to the
application of a methodology to the facts of a case.2° "Fit" also can be
viewed as a criteria of reliability for the methodology itself. Take the Cournot
model used in ConcordBoat, for example."M Is the best objection to its use
that it failed to take into account necessary facts and therefore was not a good
"fit" for the case, or that Cournot models simply do not relate to damages? In
the later instance, "fit" may be a criteria of reliability of the methodology that
asks: "Is it being used for the purposes for which it was designed?"
V Conclusion: Is Daubert Testable?
Daubert and its progeny are working their way more and more pervasively into the process of antitrust litigation, but with uncertain outcomes.
Lack of adherence to the admissibility versus sufficiency distinction continues
to undermine the precision and ultimately the utility ofDaubertconsiderations
by the courts in antitrust cases. It also completes the task of appellate review.
Moreover, it is still too early to tell whether courts have fully digested Kumho
Tire's direction that criteria of reliability need to be established for each
methodological step undertaken by the expert.
One trend, however, does appear to be well defined: Dauberthas contributed yet another layer of expensive and time consuming satellite litigation
to the already encumbered process of litigating antitrust cases. In this regard,
as noted at the outset, it is not too early to ask. "Is it worth it?" As was true
ofthe federal courts' experience with the 1983 amendments to Rule 11,210 the
quest for greater integrity in the process of litigating may in fact have had the
unintended, but opposite, consequence of further miring the litigation process
in additional layers of costly, but inconsequential process. Experts and litigators alike report two, four, and even six day long "Dauberthearings." Whereas challenges to the experts previously were handled through papers filed in
support of summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, the Daubert
207. See ConcordBoat,207 F3d at 1055-56 (discussing requirement that experttestimony
must "fit"
facts of particular case).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1056-57.
210. See Andrew L Gavil, Attitudinal Discretion and the Prospectsfor Reinvigorating
Antitrust: A Look at the New FederalRules, 39 ANITUST BULTL. 27, 37-41 (1994) (discussing impact of 1983 revisions to Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on antitrust litigation).
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hearing process frequently leads to mini-trials, complete with opening and
closing statements, witness preparation and testimony, cross-examination, and
demonstrative exhibits. On occasion, even supporting multi-media presentations are utilized. Of course, all of these factors contribute to significantly
increased attorneys' and experts' fees.
The high cost of these hearings appears to be justified in the eyes of the
parties bythe high stakes. Typically, antitrust cases that get as far as litigation
involve significant damage claims that may reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars after trebling. Also typically, the expert's testimony, whether
in support of liability or damages, is a critical element inthe plaintiff's case.
If the expert can be excluded, therefore, summary judgment frequently will
follow; if the plaintiff's expert survives the gauntlet, the prospects for summary judgment may be dim. But expensive process can yield a significant
advantage to the more well-heeled party, typically the defendant in these
cases. Dauberthearings thus become but one additional device for seeking
strategic advantage and wearing down the opposition.
Can the added expense really be worth it? The promised benefit of the
process is the identification and elimination of unreliable expert testimony at
the earliest moment in the litigation. But is there any hard evidence to suggest
that prior to Daubert actual verdicts withstood appellate review based on
demonstrably unreliable economic techniques? If not, if "shaky but admissible"211 expert evidence rarely made it through the rigorous summary judgment
process, what is gained by separating the admissibility question, briefing it,
and conducting an extended, live hearing? These are hard but critical questions that warrant further study.
In short, it is time to ask. "Is Daubert,itself testable?" Whereas the goals
of weeding out "junk economics" and discouraging unsupportable antitrust
litigation may be laudable, it is uncertain that the Daubertprocess represents
a cost-effective means of achieving those goals. Ironically, Daubert was
implemented unscientifically. There was no prior study of the uses of expert
testimony in the federal courts to support its implicit assumption that 'Junk
science" was a uniformly troubling phenomenon. To evaluate its utility, it is
critical to know how often Daubert motions are being filed and granted and
in what sorts of cases. Without data, the very much needed cost/benefit
analysis cannot be reliably conducted. A survey of district court judges, as
was done in the Rule 11 context,212 might prove instructive. What is the
211.

As the Court concluded in Daubert "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of

contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and ap-

propriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579,596 (1993).
212. FEDERALJUDICIALCTERRUL 11: FIALREPORTTOTHEADVISORYCOMM1TEE
ON CIVILRULEs OF Tm JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE oF TBE UNITED STATES (1991).
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typical length of a Dauberthearing? Does it vary by type of case? Amount
m controversy? And perhaps most critically, do the judges considering the
motions find the process to be useful and cost-effective? Ifjudges report that
(1) truly junk economics is rare; (2) m any event, it would have been excluded
under pre-Daubertstandards; and (3) more often than not shaky expert testimony is better addressed m the context of sufficiency determinations like
summary judgment, we may well find that Daubertfails its own tests - it may
not be reliable, and it may not really aid the trier of fact213 to "secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.1

213. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. At least one district court has observed that the principles of Rule
1 must guide that court's decision whether to conduct a Daubert hearing. See Lannu v. New
Jersey, 177 F.RD. 295, 303 (D.N.J. 1998) ("[A] full evidentiary hearing on the reliability of the
expert testimony is not required byDaubert and would cause unnecessary expense and delay.").

